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BIOMETRIC CYBERINTELLIGENCE AND THE 
POSSE COMITATUS ACT 
Margaret Hu∗ 
ABSTRACT 
This Article addresses the rapid growth of what the military and the 
intelligence community refer to as “biometric-enabled intelligence.” This newly 
emerging intelligence tool is reliant upon biometric databases—for example, 
digitalized storage of scanned fingerprints and irises, digital photographs for 
facial recognition technology, and DNA. This Article introduces the term 
“biometric cyberintelligence” to more accurately describe the manner in which 
this new tool is dependent upon cybersurveillance and big data’s mass-
integrative systems.  
This Article argues that the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, designed to limit 
the deployment of federal military resources in the service of domestic policies, 
will be difficult to enforce to protect against militarized cyberpolicing and 
cybersurveillance harms that may generate from the domestic use of military 
grade cybersurveillance tools. Maintaining strict separation of data between 
military and intelligence operations on the one hand, and civilian, homeland 
security, and domestic law enforcement agencies on the other hand, is 
increasingly difficult as cooperative data sharing increases. The Posse 
Comitatus Act and constitutional protections such as the Fourth Amendment’s 
privacy jurisprudence, therefore, must be reinforced in the digital age to 
appropriately protect citizens from militarized cyberpolicing: the blending of 
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military/foreign intelligence tools and operations, and homeland 
security/domestic law enforcement tools and operations. The Article concludes 
that, as of yet, neither statutory nor constitutional protections have evolved 
sufficiently to cover the unprecedented surveillance harms posed by the 
migration of biometric cyberintelligence from foreign to domestic use. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The potential cybersurveillance consequences of mass biometric data 
collection are not yet fully known.1 What is known, however, is that mass 
biometric data storage and analysis can lead to multiple unprecedented legal 
challenges2 as big data tools and new forms of cybersurveillance technologies 
place increasing strain on existing privacy law doctrine,3 statutory data privacy 
protections, and constitutional protections.4 Experts note that this legal strain is 
 
 1 Multiple scholars and experts have researched the legal consequences of newly emerging surveillance 
technologies, including those disclosed by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden. See, e.g., Laura K. 
Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 117, 162–64 (2015); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. 
PA. L. REV. 327, 366–71 (2015); Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First 
Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 498–500 (2015); 
Orin S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. 1513, 1515–18 (2014); 
Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269, 
287–89 (2012); Nathan Alexander Sales, Domesticating Programmatic Surveillance: Some Thoughts on the NSA 
Controversy, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 523, 533–34 (2014); Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism 
and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 112, 117–19 (2015); 
Christopher Slobogin, Cause to Believe What? The Importance of Defining a Search’s Object—Or, How the 
ABA Would Analyze the NSA Metadata Surveillance Program, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 725, 725–28 (2014); 
Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 
GEO. L.J. 1721, 1723–24 (2014) [hereinafter Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance]; Omer Tene, A New Harm Matrix 
for Cybersecurity Surveillance, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 391, 412–14 (2014); Patrick Toomey & Brett Max 
Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice, 54 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 843, 844–46 (2014); Stephen I. Vladeck, Standing and Secret Surveillance, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 551, 554, 566–68 (2014); John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data 
Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901, 901–07 (2014).  
 2 See, e.g., JENNIFER LYNCH, IMMIGRATION POL’Y CTR., FROM FINGER PRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA 
COLLECTION IN U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND 12–13 (2012); Laura K. Donohue, Technological 
Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. 
REV. 407, 551–53 (2012); D.H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation of 
Private Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 70–71 (2007); David H. Kaye, Rounding Up the Usual 
Suspects: A Legal and Logical Analysis of DNA Trawling Cases, 87 N.C. L. REV. 425, 426–33 (2009) (discussing 
how prosecutors can identify defendants by “trawling” through databases of DNA to generate random matches); 
Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? Deciding When DNA Alone Is Enough to Convict, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1130, 
1158–70 (2010); see also A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN & JONATHAN WEINBERG, CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. 
ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, HARD TO BELIEVE: THE HIGH COST OF A BIOMETRIC IDENTITY CARD 8–9 (2012), 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Believe_Report_Final.pdf. 
 3 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT 17 (2007); Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total 
Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 265–66 (2013); Neil M. Richards, 
The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1956 (2013); Christopher Slobogin, Is the Fourth 
Amendment Relevant in a Technological Age?, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
11, 12 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of 
Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1136–37 (2002). 
 4 See, e.g., RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES 
WITH AMERICANS’ DATA 2–3 (2013); Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal 
HU GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/22/2017 2:15 PM 
700 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:697 
especially acute as the programmatic and technological architecture of big data 
cybersurveillance can be embedded within the data collection and data analysis 
protocols of civilian and domestic law enforcement activities,5 and the everyday 
activities of an information society that is in the midst of a big data revolution.6 
Therefore, maintaining strict separation of data sharing between military and 
foreign intelligence operations7 on the one hand, and civilian, homeland 
security, and domestic law enforcement agencies on the other hand,8 is 
increasingly difficult and may be impracticable. 
To better understand the potential legal consequences of the merger of 
civilian and military, along with domestic and foreign mass biometric data 
harvesting, this Article demonstrates the potential long-term cybersurveillance 
consequences of the increased sharing of biometric databases between military, 
intelligence, and law enforcement organizations, and other public and private 
entities.9 Specifically, this Article contends that biometric cybersurveillance and 
biometric cyberintelligence objectives are increasingly used to justify the mass 
digital capture and analysis of unique physiological and behavioral traits of 
 
Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 453 (2008); Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The 
Explosion of Targeted, Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 353–54 (2014); Peter Margulies, 
Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content Collection After Snowden, 66 
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 51–52 (2014); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 328–29 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 343, 349–50 (2008). 
 5 See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 103–04 (2014); Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital 
Innocence, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 981, 992 (2014); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative 
Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 101–03 (2013). 
 6 See, e.g., VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL 
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK (2013); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING 
SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 175–84 (2004); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the 
Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 65 (2012); see also DAVID LYON, THE 
ELECTRONIC EYE: THE RISE OF SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY 197 (1994); David Lyon, Surveillance as Social Sorting: 
Computer Codes and Mobile Bodies, in SURVEILLANCE AS SOCIAL SORTING: PRIVACY, RISK, AND DIGITAL 
DISCRIMINATION 13, 13 (David Lyon ed., 2003).  
 7 See, e.g., William C. Banks, Programmatic Surveillance and FISA: Of Needles in Haystacks, 88 TEX. 
L. REV. 1633, 1658 (2010); William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1278–80 (2007). 
 8 See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Big Data Before and After Snowden, 7 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 
333, 334 (2014). 
 9 Multiple scholars have researched the intersection of biometric identification technologies and post-9/11 
government surveillance. See, e.g., GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE AND POLICING: BORDERS, SECURITY, IDENTITY (Elia 
Zureik & Mark B. Salter eds., 2005); David Lyon, Biometrics, Identification and Surveillance, 22 BIOETHICS 
499, 500 (2008); Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1328–44 (2008); Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Signaling Exhaustion and Perfect Exclusion, 10 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 321, 326–27 
(2012); Elia Zureik & Karen Hindle, Governance, Security and Technology: The Case of Biometrics, 73 STUD. 
POL. ECON. 113, 121–24 (2004). 
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entire populations and subpopulations.10 Traditional bureaucratized surveillance 
protocols are in the process of merging with bureaucratized big data 
cybersurveillance systems to increasingly incentivize the development of 
universal biometric databases of the entire citizenry, often through biometric-
based national ID systems,11 and particular biometric databases of targeted 
classes within a specific citizenry, for example, DNA databases of arrestees.12 
Further, as nations enter into agreements to share biometric databases for 
military defense, foreign intelligence, and law enforcement purposes, the 
multinational cybersurveillance implications of biometric data collection and 
data analysis are likely to expand over time.13 
Biometrics is “[t]he science of automatic identification or identity 
verification of individuals using physiological or behavioral characteristics.”14 
 
 10 See, e.g., David H. Kaye, A Fourth Amendment Theory for Arrestee DNA and Other Biometric 
Databases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1095, 1096–97 (2013); Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Criminal Justice, 
False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 721, 725–26 (2007). Other 
scholars specifically focus their scholarship on a growing predominance of behavioral genetics and the use of 
neuroscience evidence in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating Thoughts, 64 
STAN. L. REV. 351, 367–68 (2012); Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1241–42 
(2012). 
 11 For a discussion of what documents comprise identity cards and the surveillance consequences of 
identity documents, see generally DAVID LYON, IDENTIFYING CITIZENS: ID CARDS AS SURVEILLANCE (2009); 
PLAYING THE IDENTITY CARD: SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY AND IDENTIFICATION IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Colin 
J. Bennett & David Lyon eds., 2008). For an overview of the legal and policy implications of recently adopted 
and recently proposed digitalized identification systems, including privacy issues, see, for example, JIM HARPER, 
IDENTITY CRISIS: HOW IDENTIFICATION IS OVERUSED AND MISUNDERSTOOD 4–5 (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, 
CODE VERSION 2.0, at 45–54, 68–70 (2d ed. 2006); Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and 
Rationality: A Survey, in PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 
15, 29 (Katherine J. Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006); Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity 
and Personhood in National Identification Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 319, 323–24 (2002). 
 12 See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Joh, DNA Theft: Recognizing the Crime of Nonconsensual Genetic Collection and 
Testing, 91 B.U. L. REV. 665, 668–70 (2011); Erin Murphy, License, Registration, Cheek Swab: DNA Testing 
and the Divided Court, 127 HARV. L. REV. 161 (2013). 
 13 See, e.g., U.K. BORDER AGENCY, REPORT OF A PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED BY THE UK 
BORDER AGENCY IN RELATION TO THE HIGH VALUE DATA SHARING PROTOCOL AMONGST THE IMMIGRATION 
AUTHORITIES OF THE FIVE COUNTRY CONFERENCE 34–35 (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/ 
sitecontent/documents/aboutus/workingwithus/high-value-data-sharing-protocol/pia.pdf. 
 14 JOHN R. VACCA, BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES AND VERIFICATION SYSTEMS 589 (2007). Numerous 
scholars and experts have explored the science and application of biometrics and the consequences of this 
emerging technology. See, e.g., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (Joseph N. Pato 
& Lynette I. Millett eds., 2010); KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE 26–27 (2011); ANIL K. JAIN, ARUN A. ROSS & KARTHIK 
NANDAKUMAR, INTRODUCTION TO BIOMETRICS 43–44 (2011); DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE STUDIES: AN 
OVERVIEW 118–36 (2007); SHOSHANA AMIELLE MAGNET, WHEN BIOMETRICS FAIL: GENDER, RACE, AND THE 
TECHNOLOGY OF IDENTITY (2011); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE 157–89 (2005); VACCA, supra; 
Robin Feldman, Considerations on the Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25 HASTINGS 
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Traditionally, these physiological traits have included digitally scanned 
fingerprints, digital photo analysis through facial recognition technology, iris 
scans, and DNA.15 Increasingly, physiological identifiers that can be digitally 
captured, stored, and analyzed include more experimental biometrics, including 
gait,16 skeletal bone scans,17 scars and tattoos,18 ear shape19 and eyebrow 
shape,20 breathing rates,21 and eye pupil dilation,22 among other identifiers. 
Understanding how the intelligence community and military branches may 
use biometric cybersurveillance tools and techniques—indeed, understanding 
biometric cybersurveillance itself—is crucial to the ongoing project amongst 
legal scholars of understanding the burgeoning “National Surveillance State.”23 
This academic inquiry theorizes the necessary legal safeguards to protect civil 
liberties and democratic governance while allowing the surveillance necessary 
for national security to go forward. Military surveillance abroad is less restrained 
 
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653, 667–69 (2003); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-174, TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS FOR BORDER SECURITY (2002), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/157313.pdf.  
 15 See, e.g., SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37–
61 (2000) (describing the rise of biometrics and expansion of biometric databases). 
 16 See, e.g., VACCA, supra note 14, at 32. 
 17 See, e.g., Sara Gates, Knee Scan Identification: MRIs May Be Better Way to ID Travelers, Study 
Suggests, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2013, 12:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/25/kneecap-
scans-identification-biometric-id_n_2543042.html; Mathew J. Schwartz, Skeletal Scans Explored for Crime 
Fighting, INFORMATIONWEEK (Aug. 26, 2010, 12:58 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/database/ 
skeletal-scans-explored-for-crime-fighting/d/d-id/1091933?. 
 18 See, e.g., Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo 
System, FBI (Sept. 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/services/records-management/foipa/privacy-impact-
assessments/interstate-photo-system. The media stored by the FBI’s Next Generation Identification system 
includes photographs searchable by using facial recognition technology, as well as photographs of scars, distinct 
marks, and tattoos. See Next Generation Identification (NGI), FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ 
fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Nov. 10, 2016); Privacy Impact Assessment Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)/Next Generation Identification (NGI) Biometric Interoperability, FBI 
(Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.fbi.gov/services/records-management/foipa/privacy-impact-assessments/iafis-ngi-
biometric-interoperability. 
 19 See, e.g., VACCA, supra note 14, at 203–04. 
 20 See, e.g., YUJIE DONG & DAMON L. WOODARD, EYEBROW SHAPE-BASED FEATURES FOR BIOMETRIC 
RECOGNITION AND GENDER CLASSIFICATION: A FEASIBILITY STUDY (2011). 
 21 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/S&T/PIA-012(A), PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
UPDATE FOR THE FUTURE ATTRIBUTE SCREENING TECHNOLOGY (FAST)/PASSIVE METHODS FOR PRECISION 
BEHAVIORAL SCREENING 5 (2011) [hereinafter PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR FAST (2011)], 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_st_fast-a.pdf. 
 22 See, e.g., Pam Benson, Will Airports Screen for Body Signals? Researchers Hope So, CNN (Oct. 6, 
2009, 9:15 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/10/06/security.screening/index.html?eref=onion#cnnSTCT 
ext.html. 
 23 See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2008); 
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan Entrenchment to 
the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 489–90 (2006). 
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than the kinds of civilian surveillance allowed domestically; however, the 
efficiencies of cybersurveillance technologies being tested and implemented 
abroad can and likely will, in time, have application in serving domestic law 
enforcement objectives and homeland security intelligence purposes. 
Digitalized biometric data now forms the basis for what the U.S. government 
terms “biometrically enabled intelligence”24 or “biometric-enabled 
intelligence,”25 apparently used interchangeably. In the intelligence and military 
use context, biometrically-enabled intelligence “provides an analytical baseline 
by resolving identities through high-confidence biometric matching and fusion 
with other sources of intelligence to positively identify the person in question.”26 
Biometric-enabled intelligence, in other words, is presented as an “analytical 
baseline” that is defensive in nature. It is described as a method to protect U.S. 
national security interests by making the identities of potential criminals and 
terrorists more fully transparent. The creation of an “analytical baseline” 
comprised of multiple biometric data points and other biographic data 
purportedly enhances the ability of the government to identify potential enemies 
of the state through mass data collection and analysis. 
This Article uses the term “biometric cyberintelligence” to more 
descriptively capture the process of converting digitalized biometric data into a 
product that informs tactical operations and actionable intelligence. This 
conversion process fuses together digitalized biometric matching tools—reliant 
upon vast biometric databases and sophisticated algorithmic methodologies to 
appropriately “match” an individual’s physiological and behavioral traits with 
identifiable information stored in digitalized biometric and biographic 
databases—with other emerging dataveillance tools27 and big data 
 
 24 Ben Iannotta, Biometrics: A New Intelligence Battlefield; Brings Tech Choices & Challenges, 
FORTUNA’S CORNER (May 14, 2013), http://fortunascorner.com/2013/05/14/biometrics-a-new-intelligence-
battlefield-brings-tech-choices-challenges/. 
 25 David Pendall & Cal Sieg, Biometric-Enabled Intelligence in Regional Command-East, 72 JOINT FORCE 
Q., 1st Quarter 2014, at 69, 70, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-72/jfq-72_69-74_Pendall-
Sieg.pdf?ver=2014-03-13-152414-890. 
 26 Paul Moruza, Intelligence Center Develops Biometrically Enabled Intelligence to Support Warfighter, 
U.S. ARMY (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.army.mil/article/93969/Intelligence_center_develops_Biometrically_ 
Enabled_Intelligence_to_support_warfighter/ (quoting Cathy Moore, Senior Intelligence Analyst, U.S. Army, 
Biometrics Division, National Ground Intelligence Center). 
 27 Data fusion has been described as “the collection of information from myriad sources to be organized 
and analyzed for a fuller picture of terrorist or other threats.” DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET 
AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE 92 (2011). In the consumer context, “data fusion” 
has been defined in the following way: “Data fusion occurs when data from different sources are brought into 
contact and new facts emerge . . . .” PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, at x 
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cybersurveillance systems.28 Whereas “biometric-enabled intelligence” appears 
to be a term that focuses more on the physiological or other forensic-based 
identification of potential criminal and terrorist suspects, this Article introduces 
the term “biometric cyberintelligence” to foreground the cybersurveillance 
consequences and intelligence-driven objectives of a data fusion process. More 
than just enabling a new kind of intelligence, biometric cyberintelligence is 
enabling a new kind of transformative policymaking protocol and governance 
philosophy, and needs to be grappled with constitutionally in that context. 
Understanding this transformation necessitates contrasting how biometric 
data operated in a small data world versus how biometric data now operates in a 
big data world. In a small data world, traditionally, the linking of a potential 
criminal suspect or terrorist suspect to forensic evidence included the reliance 
upon biometric data such as fingerprints and DNA.29 The newly emerging 
biometric analytic processes engaged by the military and the foreign and 
domestic intelligence community, however, increasingly utilize big data systems 
and data science tools rather than traditional small-data forensic science tools.30 
In a big data world, the data backbone for discerning the identity of a potential 
suspect or terrorist target, and the determination of whether consequences should 
attach to such identification, is increasingly an algorithmic process.31 Therefore, 
emerging biometric-dependent intelligence tactics should be understood as 
uniquely cyber-centered and big data driven. This shift from small data 
biometric collection and analysis to big data biometric collection and analysis, 
particularly in military and intelligence operations and tactics, should also be 
understood as paradigmatic, likely to result in profound and lasting 
consequences. 
 
(2014). Several scholars and experts have explored the legal and surveillance implications of data fusion centers 
that have been created by the government, particularly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. See, e.g., 
PRIEST & ARKIN, supra, at 92–93; Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the 
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441 (2011); Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, supra note 
1. 
 28 See, e.g., GATES, supra note 14, at 46–47; MAGNET, supra note 14; O’HARROW, supra note 14, at 157–
89; Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1478–82 (2013) [hereinafter Hu, Biometric 
ID]; Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 782–85 (2015) 
[hereinafter Hu, Data Cybersurveillance]. 
 29 See, e.g., Iannotta, supra note 24. 
 30 See, e.g., Hu, Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 28, at 775–81. 
 31 See, e.g., James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Collecting Millions of Faces from Web Images, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 31, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/01/us/nsa-collecting-millions-of-faces-from-web-
images.html. 
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The potential cybersurveillance consequences of mass biometric data 
collection are increasingly apparent. For example, National Security Presidential 
Directive 59 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 24 (NSPD-
59/HSPD-24)32 requires that data collection by military and civilian authorities 
be “interoperable”—that is, structured so that civilian data and military data can 
be commingled as needed.33 NSPD-59/HSPD-24 in effect mandates a big data-
driven bridge that makes feasible a link between military and foreign 
intelligence data gathering on one side, and domestic law enforcement and other 
civilian intelligence data gathering on the other side. The rationale for requiring 
interoperability of data collection across government is that it will make it easy 
to share data where various entities share common data tracking goals, but it is 
clear that the value of such efficiencies will undermine the firewall that Congress 
and the Constitution attempt to establish between such entities in other 
contexts.34 
The phenomenon of biometric cyberintelligence cannot be understood 
without first explicating the underlying policy rationale for comprehensive 
biometric cybersurveillance generally. Further, it is important to recognize and 
describe the potential long-term National Surveillance State consequences of an 
increasing reliance on biometric data to serve a wide range of foreign and 
domestic security goals. Consequently, this Article is highly technical and 
descriptive. This descriptive effort, however, is necessary and critical. 
Understanding the legal implications of the emerging National Surveillance 
State requires a fuller understanding of the technologies and policy rationales 
that comprise the cybersurveillance architecture of the National Surveillance 
State. This Article, therefore, is a companion to earlier related works.35 Like 
these related works, this Article must show the contours of the problem before 
addressing its legal implications. 
Accordingly, this Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I contextualizes the 
commingling of data surveillance and cybersurveillance evidence between 
military, intelligence, and domestic law enforcement organizations. Part I begins 
 
 32 Directive on Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security, NSPD-
59/HSPD-24, 1 PUB. PAPERS 757 (June 5, 2008) [hereinafter Directive on Biometrics], https://www. 
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2008-book1/pdf/PPP-2008-book1-doc-pg757.pdf (“This directive establishes a 
framework to ensure that Federal executive departments and agencies . . . use mutually compatible methods and 
procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and 
contextual information of individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner . . . .”).  
 33 Id. at 758. 
 34 See infra notes 134–137, 333–335 and accompanying text.  
 35 Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 28; Hu, Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 28. 
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with a brief overview of how the Snowden disclosures and recent criminal law 
cases combined shed light on how surveillance and big data cybersurveillance 
technologies deployed by the intelligence community can facilitate state and 
local law enforcement activities. Thus, these criminal cases illustrate the manner 
in which incriminating data, gathered either inadvertently or deliberately by 
intelligence activities, including data gathered in cybersurveillance sweeps of 
average civilians and non-terrorist targets, can be shared with domestic law 
enforcement and domestic intelligence agencies to enable prosecution. 
Next, Part I presents a recent Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals case, 
United States v. Dreyer,36 as a case study. Dreyer demonstrates exactly how 
military intelligence and cybersurveillance capacities typically deployed abroad 
for counterterrorism purposes can be deployed domestically for more day-to-
day criminal law enforcement uses, for example, here, a child pornography 
investigation.37 
Part II describes an increasing reliance by the military and intelligence 
community on biometric data and big data cybersurveillance systems to inform 
tactical decisionmaking. It focuses on how digitalized biometric data is 
increasingly collected in ways that are civilian-based and bureaucratized or 
routinized through day-to-day governance. In other words, the programmatic 
and technological architecture of biometric-enabled intelligence can be 
embedded in the data collection and data analysis protocols of civilian and 
domestic law enforcement activities. This Article argues that as biometric 
database sharing becomes more common, maintaining strict separation of data 
sharing between military and intelligence operations on the one hand, and 
civilian homeland security and domestic law enforcement agencies on the other 
hand, is increasingly difficult and may be impracticable. 
Part III discusses how this conversion process—the process of gathering and 
analyzing biometric data and converting the data into cyberintelligence—can 
serve offensive rather than defensive goals. This discussion characterizes 
biometric cyberintelligence as an active operational movement by the military 
and intelligence community, situated within a coordinated cybersurveillance 
strategy, to comprehensively capture the biometric data and personally 
identifiable data of entire populations.38 To demonstrate the potential lethality 
 
 36 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 37 Id. at 827–28. 
 38 Drone strikes have been characterized in the media and elsewhere as an offensive and preemptive 
military strategy. See, e.g., Andrew Callam, Drone Wars: Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 18 INT’L AFFAIRS 
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of the emerging technological and policy development of biometric 
cyberintelligence and biometric-enabled evidence, this Part illustrates how 
digitalized biometric data may be increasingly integrated into biometric drone 
weaponry and targeting drone strike technologies. This Part contends that the 
biometric cybersurveillance and biometric cyberintelligence technologies 
currently deployed abroad by the military and foreign intelligence communities 
are likely to migrate back to the homeland, and will likely be deployed 
domestically for federal and state law enforcement and security objectives.  
Finally, the Article concludes that increasing bureaucratization of 
cybersurveillance generally, and biometric cybersurveillance in particular, is 
integral to the rapid growth of the National Surveillance State. Although 
biometric data has been traditionally limited to forensic evidence and small data 
identification purposes, it appears that biometric cyberintelligence objectives 
may now facilitate new forms of big data tracking and mass targeting, and may 
entail unknown consequences in the context of the National Surveillance State.39 
Yet, as witnessed in Dreyer, federal courts will likely struggle with how to apply 
the Posse Comitatus Act and constitutional protections such as the Fourth 
Amendment’s privacy jurisprudence. Dreyer is a historic case in that it is an 
opportunity to question what legal tools, such as the Posse Comitatus Act, may 
be currently available to protect citizens from militarized cyberpolicing. The 
importance of this question is likely to increase as cyberintelligence tools are 
progressively integrated into daily law enforcement activities. 
 
REV. (2010), http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/144 (“[T]he CIA primarily utilizes its Predator drones in the third 
type of operation: hunter-killer missions. These operations can extend U.S. offensive capabilities into areas in 
which the United States has little or no access.”); Golo M. Bartsch, Drones as a Means of a Pre-emptive Security 
Strategy, ATLANTIC-COMMUNITY.ORG (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.atlantic-community.org/-/drones-as-a-means-
of-a-pre-emptive-security-strategy (“UCAVs [Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles] can literally be operated 
‘below the radar’ in a political and societal sense . . . . This obviously makes UCAVs suitable weapons for 
governments pursuing a ‘pre-emptive’ security strategy.”); Michael Hastings, The Rise of the Killer Drones: 
How America Goes to War in Secret, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 16, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/ 
politics/news/the-rise-of-the-killer-drones-how-america-goes-to-war-in-secret-20120416 (“Obama’s drone 
program, in fact, amounts to the largest unmanned aerial offensive ever conducted in military history . . . .”); 
Daniel Mabrey, Unmanned Assassins: UAVs and the War on Terrorism, 19 CRIME & JUST. INT’L (2003), 
http://www.cjimagazine.com/archives/cjif62c.html?id=36 (“[T]he Predator drones and other UAVs had never 
openly been used as offensive weapons prior to the military strikes in Afghanistan.”). Others in the media and 
elsewhere have characterized drone strikes as defensive in nature. See, e.g., Michael Gerson, Obama’s Drone 
Policy Is Rooted in Self-Defense, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ 
michael-gerson-obamas-drone-policy-is-rooted-in-self-defense/2013/02/06/4f1da2c2-708e-11e2-8b8d-e0b59a 
1b8e2a_story.html?utm_term=.c23166e99a02 (“Drone strikes are an innovation in anticipatory self-
defense . . . .”). 
 39 Balkin, supra note 23, at 3–4; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 23, at 490, 528. 
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I. CYBERSURVEILLANCE, MILITARY-INTELLIGENCE DATA GATHERING, AND 
THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT 
Recent media disclosures, including—most prominently—those of former 
NSA contractor Edward Snowden,40 begin to reveal the extent to which the U.S. 
intelligence communities, both foreign and domestic, increasingly collects and 
stores digitalized biometric data.41 More specifically, the Snowden disclosures 
reveal the increasing importance of biometric data as a component of mass 
surveillance and a critical tool in intelligence gathering. There is currently a 
rapid expansion of biometric databases among the intelligence community, the 
U.S. military,42 and in the public and private sectors generally.43 Biometric data 
is collected by various state and federal agencies for differing purposes in both 
the civilian and criminal context.44 Additionally, the biometric data collection 
capacities and biometric-enabled technologies in the private sector—such as the 
replacement of traditional numeric passcodes with newly emerging biometric 
passcodes, including biometric verification on smartphones,45 and other 
electronics and smart technologies46—have rapidly expanded in recent years as 
well. 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
government has claimed that biometric data, particularly when combined with 
 
 40 See, e.g., GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. 
SURVEILLANCE STATE (2014). 
 41 See, e.g., Risen & Poitras, supra note 31 (stating that the Snowden disclosures revealed the NSA collects 
millions of digital photographs from Internet and social media sources and utilizes facial recognition technology 
to identify individuals); Stephanie Simon, The Feds’ Push for Big Data, POLITICO (May 14, 2014, 5:09 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/feds-big-data-106650.html (discussing Obama Administration initiatives 
seeking to “leverage the power of big data,” including the building of an FBI facial recognition database to 
augment its fingerprint collection). 
 42 See, e.g., Rod Nordland, Afghanistan Has Big Plans for Biometric Data, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/world/asia/in-afghanistan-big-plans-to-gather-biometric-data.html; Thom 
Shanker, To Track Militants, U.S. Has System that Never Forgets a Face, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14identity.html?_r=0. 
 43 See, e.g., GLOBAL SURVEILLANCE AND POLICING, supra note 9; see also Lyon, supra note 9, at 500; 
Murphy, supra note 9, at 1341–42; Zureik & Hindle, supra note 9, at 122. 
 44 See, e.g., Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 28, at 1476–83. 
 45 See, e.g., Jack Purcher, Seven of Apple’s Biometric Patents Surface Today Covering Touch ID for Online 
Commerce, Redacting Documents & More, PATENTLY APPLE (Mar. 12, 2015, 10:39 AM), 
http://www.patentlyapple.com/patently-apple/2015/03/seven-of-apples-biometric-patents-surface-today-
covering-touch-id-for-online-commerce-redacting-documents-more.html. 
 46 See, e.g., Ed Bott, Microsoft to Add ‘Enterprise Grade’ Biometric Security to Windows 10, ZDNET (Mar. 
17, 2015, 9:04 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-to-add-enterprise-grade-biometric-security-to-
windows-10/ (announcing Microsoft’s planned 2015 replacement of passwords with fingerprint and iris 
recognition in Windows 10 devices). 
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biographic and contextual data (e.g., behavioral data and pattern of life 
analytics), critically serves multiple national security and homeland security 
objectives.47 For instance, in June 2008, President George W. Bush signed 
NSPD-59/HSPD-24.48 With the implementation of NSPD-59/HSPD-24, it is 
federal policy that biometric data be collected in forms that can be readily shared 
with other federal agencies, and that such data be shared where a person is 
suspected of posing a threat to national security.49 The U.S. Department of 
Defense is one of the agencies expressly subject to NSPD-59/HSPD-24,50 and 
is, in fact, at the cutting edge of developing methods to collect and convert 
biometric data into actionable intelligence, as this Article details.51 
The national cybersurveillance state has been documented elsewhere with a 
specific focus on the growing host of technologies and government programs 
associated with the capture and analysis of biometric data.52 In this Article, I 
focus more specifically on the military capture and use of biometric data and the 
ways that it assists in the population management policies that are a component 
of current U.S. military operations abroad. These military efficiencies in 
biometric surveillance can—and do—have application at home.53 
Jack Balkin54 and Sanford Levinson55 have theorized the emergence of a 
National Surveillance State that is an outgrowth of the national security state and 
the welfare state, itself their “logical successor.”56 The importance of thinking 
in terms of a National Surveillance State—rather than just an efflorescence of 
surveillance programs—is that it helps us to understand that surveillance is more 
 
 47 The 9/11 Commission Report, for example, emphasized the need to incorporate biometric data into 
identity management tools and systems in order to augment border security and national security objectives. 
NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 385–92 (2004), 
http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (“Linking biometric passports to good data systems and 
decisionmaking is a fundamental goal.”). 
 48 Directive on Biometrics, supra note 32. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 759. The Directive specifies the “Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security,” as well 
as the Attorney General and the DNI, but also extends to include “the heads of other appropriate agencies,” 
making its application across the federal government open-ended. Id. 
 51 See infra Part III. 
 52 See, e.g., Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 28. 
 53 See, e.g., infra note 278. 
 54 Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the First Amendment, Yale Law School, and the founder 
and director of the Information Society Project, Yale Law School. Jack M. Balkin, YALE LAW SCH., 
https://www.law.yale.edu/jack-m-balkin (last visited Aug. 31, 2016). 
 55 W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, University of Texas School 
of Law. Sanford Levinson, UNIV. OF TEX. SCH. OF LAW, https://law.utexas.edu/faculty/svl55/ (last visited Nov. 
18, 2016). 
 56 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 23, at 5. 
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than just about collecting and analyzing data for law enforcement purposes. 
Bureaucratized surveillance is about governing. Consequently, big data 
cybersurveillance tools currently being tested and deployed represent a new 
technique of governing—one that helps agencies outside purely law 
enforcement contexts to analyze and keep track of populations and population 
sub-groups. As big data cybersurveillance tools become more predictive in their 
ambition, the surveillance activities focus more on the tendencies of those 
populations and subgroups for the purpose of administering various national 
programs and for guiding public policy.57 
Military surveillance of population biometrics abroad and understanding 
how it may facilitate military objectives provides more than a study in the cutting 
edge of surveillance techniques. It is also a study in techniques of governance 
available to the modern National Surveillance State, techniques whose 
efficiency will likely lead to support for their use at home.58 
Before looking abroad, however, this Article turns first to two instances 
where military and foreign surveillance already has domestic impacts. Part I.A 
examines the phenomenon of “parallel construction.” Parallel construction is the 
effort by domestic law enforcement to recreate intelligence transferred from 
outside agencies to mask the fact that such intelligence sharing is occurring. Part 
I.B looks at another instance of intelligence sharing as revealed by the Ninth 
Circuit case, United States v. Dreyer.59 There naval investigators, although 
required by laws like the Posse Comitatus Act to restrict their law enforcement 
activities to military personnel, instead cast expansive surveillance nets—in the 
case at issue, encompassing the entire citizenry of the state of Washington.60 The 
Dreyer case reveals that mass cybersurveillance does not easily abide 
distinctions like that between military and civilian or domestic and foreign 
intelligence. In Dreyer, naval surveillance was accomplished by monitoring all 
computers in the state of Washington to investigate naval personnel engaged in 
potential wrongdoing in that state. 
 
 57 Balkin & Levinson, supra note 23, at 523 (“[A]lthough the transition to the National Surveillance State 
has been accelerated by the September 11 attacks and the Bush Administration’s proclaimed War on Terror, its 
rise is overdetermined by a host of different technological and bureaucratic imperatives.”). 
 58 See infra note 275 and accompanying text. 
 59 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 60 Id. at 833–34. 
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A. “Parallel Construction”: How Surveillance Data Is Shared Between 
Agencies and How Such Data Sharing Can Be Concealed 
Recent revelations have demonstrated that intelligence agencies with 
different jurisdictions and purposes are sharing the results of their surveillance. 
This means, for example, that information gathered by the NSA that would be 
of interest to local law enforcement is passed to local law enforcement, which 
can then act on the surveillance by conducting an independent investigation and 
prosecution. This phenomenon has been brought to light by the recent scholarly 
work of Joshua Fairfield61 and Erik Luna.62 In Digital Innocence, Fairfield and 
Luna contend that the same big data tools that can be made available to the 
prosecution for evidence to incriminate the guilty should, conversely, be made 
available to the criminal defense for exculpatory evidence to exonerate the 
innocent.63 This work documents the manner in which big data 
cybersurveillance technologies deployed by both foreign and domestic 
intelligence communities can facilitate federal, state, and local law enforcement 
activities.64 It demonstrates that national surveillance programs justified on the 
basis of serving one objective, like national security, often are not limited to that 
objective, because incriminating data gathered inadvertently by intelligence 
activities against average civilians and non-terrorist targets can be shared 
domestically to enable state and federal prosecution. 
Recently, in multiple domestic criminal cases in the U.S federal courts,  the 
criminal defense discovered that the prosecution is relying upon classified 
evidence.65 Often, the defense is made aware that incriminating evidence was 
 
 61 Professor of Law at Washington and Lee University School of Law. Joshua A.T. Fairfield, WASH. & 
LEE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, https://law2.wlu.edu/faculty/profiledetail.asp?id=242 (last visited Aug. 31, 2016). 
 62 Amelia D. Lewis Professor of Constitutional and Criminal Law at Arizona State University’s Sandra 
Day O’Connor College of Law. Erik Luna, ARIZ. STATE UNIV., https://apps.law.asu.edu/Apps/Faculty/ 
Faculty.aspx?individual_id=127801 (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).  
 63 Fairfield & Luna, supra note 5, at 1043–44. 
 64 Id. at 996–1007. 
 65 See id. at 1025 n.292 (citing United States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal. 
Nov. 18, 2013) (ordering that a new trial motion should be denied. This order also discusses the defendants 
motions to suppress FISA information and deny CIPA information)); id. at 1037 n.351 (citing United States v. 
Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding, inter alia, that as a matter of first impression, a motion to 
intervene to assert public’s First Amendment right to access of criminal proceedings is proper)); id. at 1046 
n.405 (citing United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding, inter alia, that there was 
no abuse of discretion in admission of certain information pertaining to certain intelligence projects and CIA 
locations that the Attorney General had stated were classified, where a district court judge had ruled them 
relevant and admissible)); id. at 1049 n.426 (citing United States v. Al-Arian, 267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1266 (M.D. 
Fla. 2003) (holding, among other things, that requiring defense attorneys and their staffs to submit to a security 
clearance procedure to protect classified information outweighed an individuals privacy interest)); id. at 1049 
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gathered against the criminal defendant pursuant to authorization under the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and authorized by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court), or other classified evidence. FISA 
requires the government to obtain a judicial warrant similar to that required in 
criminal investigations prior to commencing intelligence-gathering operations 
within the United States.66 Warrant applications submitted to the FISA Court are 
drafted by government attorneys and must include certification that the proposed 
surveillance is targeted against a foreign power or its agent.67 In the case of 
inadvertent collection of information involving a U.S. citizen or resident alien, 
the government must minimize nonpublic information captured.68 Where it has 
come to light that the prosecution is relying upon classified evidence, the defense 
must then seek access to the classified evidence by viewing the fruits of the 
cybersurveillance or the evidence of other secret intelligence activities—for 
example, the data or other evidence collected by the NSA and the CIA. In some 
of the cases identified, access to the classified evidence must be sought pursuant 
to the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) of 1980.69 
Intelligence agencies appear to disguise the sharing of surveillance 
information by encouraging or requiring the recipient agency of such 
surveillance data to engage in parallel construction.70 Parallel construction 
occurs when law enforcement receives intelligence from the NSA or another 
secret intelligence source. Law enforcement officials reconstruct the evidence to 
hide the original source of the information (e.g., the data gathering activities of 
the NSA).71 
 
n.427 (citing United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 253–54 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding, among other things, that 
a district court’s determination that redacted classified information need not be disclosed to the defendant, his 
uncleared counsel, and the public was not an abuse of discretion, and that the exclusion of the defendant and his 
counsel from proceedings related to this information was not violative of the Confrontation Clause)).  
 66 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783. 
 67 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (2012). 
 68 See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2012). 
 69 Pub. L. No. 96–456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified at 18 U.S.C. app. iii §§ 1–16 (2012)). 
 70 Fairfield & Luna, supra note 5, at 1042. 
 71 Id. at 1042–43. Fairfield and Luna elaborate: 
[I]ntelligence and law enforcement agencies have actively shared information. Reportedly, 
however, law enforcement officials have been instructed to hide the source of this information. 
According to documents reviewed by the news agency Reuters, an entity within the Drug 
Enforcement Agency—the Special Operations Division (SOD)—funnels NSA intelligence to law 
enforcement officers but directs them to conceal the true origins of any resulting criminal 
investigation from defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges. To pull off this ruse, law 
enforcement is trained to ‘recreate’ information through a process euphemistically termed ‘parallel 
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In other words, parallel construction recreates legitimate domestic law 
enforcement evidence from foreign intelligence or secret intelligence.72 This 
deliberate reconstruction of evidence, in effect, covers up the fact that such 
secret intelligence sharing occurred. The data sharing between the secret 
intelligence agency with the domestic law enforcement agency may be covered 
up out of concerns about the legality of the sharing of such information, or 
concerns about unwanted disclosure. Either way, the broader consequences 
constitutional are profound. In effect, surveillance capacities authorized for the 
purpose of protecting the domestic population from foreign threats are being 
turned upon that very population and used against it, even if that is not the 
primary purpose of such surveillance. 
If military or foreign intelligence gathered by governmental agencies 
ostensibly not concerned with enforcement of domestic laws is secretly used for 
that purpose, then this is the very hallmark of the National Surveillance State, 
according to Balkin and Levinson.73 Further, Balkin and Levinson predict that 
under the National Surveillance State, secret law enforcement systems that at 
first are kept separate from transparent law enforcement systems will eventually 
intersect.74 Parallel construction appears to signal that at the earliest stages of 
the National Surveillance State, we are witnessing the merger between the secret 
law enforcement system and the transparent law enforcement system. 
B. Posse Comitatus Act and United States v. Dreyer 
Data sharing of surveillance results also occurs between military agencies 
and civilian agencies—even though there are legal protections designed to 
inhibit such transfers, as illustrated by recent cybersurveillance and data sharing 
case, United States v. Dreyer.75 Dreyer concerned mass cybersurveillance 
technology that had been deployed by Naval intelligence domestically. The 
cybersurveillance was conducted to uncover military personnel engaged in the 
traffic of child pornography, but the program cast a much wider net, placing all 
computers in the state of Washington under surveillance.76 
 
construction’: laundering the information in question by concocting independent sources through 
field interviews, confidential informants, physical searches and seizures, etc.  
Id. at 1042 (footnotes omitted). 
 72 Id. at 1042. 
 73 See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 23, at 520–26. 
 74 Id. 
 75 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 76 Id. at 833–34. 
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Generally, the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) prohibits the Army and the Air 
Force from participating in the enforcement of civilian laws.77 More specifically, 
the PCA prevents the personnel of the Army or Air Force from enforcing civilian 
laws without express constitutional or congressional authority.78 By a separate 
statute, Congress required the Secretary of Defense to establish comparable 
regulations also preventing members of the Navy and Marine Corps from 
participating in civilian law enforcement.79 Thus, the language of the PCA is 
often interpreted to extend to the Navy and Marines through U.S. Department of 
Defense policy.80 The Act has led to exclusion of evidence, dismissal of criminal 
charges, and civil causes of action.81 It is a criminal statute and can therefore 
“render[] the transgressor liable to criminal penalties.”82 
Most commonly, a violation of the PCA occurs when the military either 
performs tasks assigned to civil government or when the military performs tasks 
assigned to it for solely civilian government purposes.83 Further, if the military 
provides assistance to civilian police, it cannot be direct. Though there are some 
 
 77 See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012).  
 78 CHARLES DOYLE & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42659, THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT 
AND RELATED MATTERS: THE USE OF THE MILITARY TO EXECUTE CIVILIAN LAW, at Summary (2012), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42659.pdf. 
 79 10 U.S.C. § 375 (2012) (“The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary 
to ensure that any activity (including the provision of any equipment or facility or the assignment or detail of 
any personnel) under this chapter does not include or permit direct participation by a member of the Army, Navy, 
Air Force, or Marine Corps in a search, seizure, arrest, or other similar activity unless participation in such 
activity by such member is otherwise authorized by law.”); see also 32 C.F.R. § 182.6(a)(1)(iii)(A) (2016) 
(“DoD personnel are prohibited from providing the following forms of direct civilian law enforcement assistance 
(1) Interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other similar activity. (2) A search or seizure. (3) An arrest; 
apprehension; stop and frisk; engaging in interviews, interrogation, canvassing, or questioning of potential 
witnesses or suspects; or similar activity. (4) Using force or physical violence, brandishing a weapon, 
discharging or using a weapon, or threatening to discharge or use a weapon except in self-defense, in defense of 
other DoD persons in the vicinity, or in defense of non-DoD persons, including civilian law enforcement 
personnel, in the vicinity when directly related to an assigned activity or mission. (5) Evidence collection; 
security functions; crowd and traffic control; and operating, manning, or staffing checkpoints. (6) Surveillance 
or pursuit of individuals, vehicles, items, transactions, or physical locations, or acting as undercover agents, 
informants, investigators, or interrogators. (7) Forensic investigations or other testing of evidence obtained from 
a suspect for use in a civilian law enforcement investigation in the United States unless there is a DoD nexus 
(e.g., the victim is a member of the Military Services or the crime occurred on an installation under exclusive 
DoD jurisdiction) or the responsible civilian law enforcement official requesting such testing declares in writing 
that the evidence to be examined was obtained by consent. Requests for exceptions to this restriction must be 
made through channels to the ASD (HD&ASA), who will evaluate, in coordination with the General Counsel of 
the Department of Defense, whether to seek Secretary of Defense authorization for an exception to policy.”)  
 80 DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 78, at 56 n.332. 
 81 Id. at 62–65. 
 82 E.g., United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 376 (4th Cir. 1974). 
 83 DOYLE & ELSEA, supra note 78, at 53. 
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exceptions,84 there is direct assistance when military involvement: includes “‘the 
exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power’; . . . 
‘amount[s] to direct active involvement in the execution of the laws’; and . . . 
‘pervade[s] the activities of the civilian authorities.’”85 Although the PCA 
mentions only the Army and the Air Force, courts have applied PCA-like rules 
to the Navy and Marines through other laws and administrative regulations.86 
In United States v. Dreyer, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, found that naval 
cybersurveillance of a state-wide scope violated the PCA and indicated that 
evidence resulting from future comparable violations could be subject to 
application of the exclusionary rule. Although the case did not involve direct 
surveillance of biometric data, it illustrates how cyberintelligence refuses to 
abide the bright line distinctions that Congress attempted to secure in statutes 
like the PCA. 
Due to the litigation record, Dreyer provides a glimpse into how military 
cybersurveillance can easily result in direct consequences for civilians. The facts 
of the case tell a story about how military domestic surveillance resulted in local 
law enforcement actions against a civilian and private citizen. The case involves 
the use of a surveillance program referred to as “RoundUp” by Steve Logan, a 
special agent of the Brunswick, Georgia, office of the Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS).87 RoundUp made it possible to search all 
“computers located in Washington state sharing known child pornography on 
the Gnutella file-sharing network.”88 RoundUp identifies files that the user 
inputs “by comparing the ‘SHA–1 hash values’ of files being offered for 
download—unique identifiers that do not change when a file name is altered—
with values already known to be associated with child pornography.”89 Through 
the RoundUp cybersurveillance software, it appears that the agent had the ability 
to search the file as well as determine who had downloaded the file through the 
file-sharing website.90 Once the computer that downloaded it had been 
 
 84 One exception is for an “independent military purpose,” where the primary purpose of military 
participation is to “further[] a military or foreign affairs function . . . regardless of incidental benefits to civilian 
authorities.” United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826, 833 (9th Cir. 2014), abrogated by 804 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 
2015) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Hitchcock, 286 F.3d 1064 , 1069 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
 85 Dreyer, 804 F.3d at 1275 (quoting United States v. Khan, 35 F.3d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 86 Id. at 1273 (explaining that “‘PCA-like restrictions’ adopted pursuant to § 375 apply to the Navy and 
NCIS . . . .”).  
 87 Id. at 1270. 
 88 Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 827–28.  
 89 Id. at 828 n.2. 
 90 Id. at 828. 
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identified, the agent was able to download the files from that computer and 
verify the files contained child pornography.91 
Logan “found a computer [on the Gnutella network] using the Internet 
Protocol (IP) address 67.160.77.21 sharing several files identified by RoundUp 
as child pornography.”92After Logan searched the files and identified the 
computer that had downloaded the files in question, he made a request for an 
administrative subpoena for the name and address associated with the IP 
address.93 This subpoena was then forwarded to the FBI, who, in turn, made an 
administrative subpoena request to Comcast.94 Comcast then provided the name 
and address of the defendant, Michael Dreyer, pursuant to the administrative 
subpoena.95 After Logan received the name and address of Dreyer from 
Comcast, verifying Dreyer as the user of the computer that had downloaded the 
files, Logan screened the U.S. Department of Defense database to determine if 
the defendant had a military affiliation.96 
When Logan discovered that Dreyer had no current military affiliation, he 
wrote a report summarizing the incriminating evidence against Dreyer.97 At this 
point, Logan submitted the report to the Washington state NCIS office.98 That 
office gave the report and supporting material to local law enforcement 
authorities, namely Officer Schrimpsher of the Algona Police Department in the 
state of Washington.99 Officer Schrimpsher contacted the Seattle, Washington, 
police department and received a sample of a search warrant affidavit.100 Officer 
Schrimpsher then prepared a search warrant application, attached all of the 
materials given to him by Agent Logan, and filed it with the state court.101 With 
the warrant, the Algona Police Department searched Dreyer’s premises, found 
evidence of child pornography on his desktop computer, and confiscated it.102 
Dreyer was arrested and charged with distribution and possession of child 
pornography.103 The cybersurveillance activities of Agent Logan were obtained 
 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. at 828−29.  
 103 Id. at 829.  
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in discovery.104 Dreyer was ultimately convicted. He appealed, arguing, among 
other things, the evidence should have been suppressed because his prosecution 
amounted to military enforcement of civilian laws in violation of the PCA-like 
restrictions applicable to the Navy.105 Because the PCA does not expressly apply 
to Navy personnel, Dreyer argued that the NCIS involvement in his case violated 
PCA principles.106 Even though NCIS agents, including Agent Logan, are 
civilians, the Ninth Circuit agreed that they acted under the auspices of the 
military.107 The court further found that Logan was directly and actively 
involved in civilian enforcement in his role as an investigator.108 That conduct 
violated Department of Defense regulations and policies placing the Navy under 
PCA-like restrictions, as required by 10 U.S.C. § 375.109 
The initial Ninth Circuit panel held that evidence resulting from violations 
of the PCA-like restrictions on the Navy should be suppressed.110 Although one 
judge dissented and at a rehearing en banc the application of the exclusionary 
rule was overturned, the reasons for initially applying the rule resulted from the 
panel’s strong concerns about allowing such sweeping cybersurveillance to go 
unchecked. In the panel decision, the court explained that application of the 
exclusionary rule in the PCA context was only warranted where there exists a 
need to deter future violations.111 The initial panel found a need for deterrence, 
having been struck by “the extraordinary nature of the surveillance”: “So far as 
we can tell from the record, it has become a routine practice for the Navy to 
conduct surveillance of all the civilian computers in an entire state . . . .”112 The 
decision suggests that the court was more concerned with the all-encompassing 
nature of the surveillance employed than with the fact that it was carried out 
under military auspices. 
 
 104 Schrimpsher’s affidavit “contained a number of misrepresentations and omissions.” Defendant-
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 8, United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2014) (No. 13-30077). “The 
government conceded that the warrant contained misrepresentations, but argued they were not fatal to the 
warrant because Schrimpsher appended Logan’s report to his affidavit.” Id. at 10.  
 105 Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 829–30 (discussing the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012)).  
 106 Id. PCA principles “apply to the Navy as a matter of Department of Defense . . . policy. Id. at 830. 
 107 Id. at 836–37. 
 108 Id. at 832. Courts have held that the following activities “constitute[d] an active role in direct law 
enforcement . . . : arrest; seizure of evidence; search of a person; search of a building; investigation of crime; 
interviewing witnesses; pursuit of an escaped civilian prisoner; search of an area for a suspect and other like 
activities.” See, e.g., United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 925 (D.S.D. 1975). 
 109 Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 830, 835. 
 110 Id. at 837.  
 111 Id. at 835–36.  
 112 Id. at 836. 
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Dreyer was later reheard by the Ninth Circuit en banc with the en banc 
decision departing from the panel decision in significant ways. While it upheld 
the finding that the surveillance was carried out in violation of the PCA-like 
restrictions applicable to the Navy, the en banc court concluded that suppression 
was not warranted in this instance, even though it reserved the possibility that 
suppression of evidence could be a remedy for future, comparable violations.113 
Here it is important to note how the cybersurveillance side of the biometric 
cybersurveillance coin shows that technological capacity outstrips attempts to 
create firewalls between military and civilian, and foreign and domestic 
operations. Logan engaged in a state-wide surveillance to target naval personnel 
engaged in sharing child pornography. His cybersurveillance search was found 
to be overbroad, casting the net too widely for the sake of efficiency, rather than 
trying to identify how to confine the initial search only to computers used by 
military personnel. After having identified suspects state-wide, the search was 
then narrowed to comport with the PCA by winnowing out non-military 
personnel—something the Ninth Circuit indicated should have been done in the 
first instance. 
The panel decision noted that Agent Logan’s activities may have fallen under 
the independent military purpose exception had he restricted his search to areas 
where there was a significant Navy interest rather than expanding it to all 
computers within the state of Washington.114 Thus, the scope of the initial search 
brought it outside the reach of an independent military purpose. The court went 
further and noted that RoundUp displays the general geographic location of each 
hit—a suspect computer IP address.115 Dreyer’s IP address was located in an 
area within thirty miles of several military institutions—but that area also was 
close to Seattle and Tacoma, leading the panel to conclude again that there was 
insufficient evidence of a military purpose at this stage.116 
Importantly, the violation of the PCA-like restrictions on the Navy derived 
then not from the fact that the NCIS agent passed the information he uncovered 
on to civilian authorities, but, from the scope of the surveillance itself.117 The 
court rejected the government’s view that such a search, without more, is 
acceptable, analogizing the NCIS’s conduct to having NCIS agents “routinely 
 
 113 United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1280–81 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 114 Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 833–34. 
 115 Id. at 834. 
 116 Id. 
 117 “Because Agent Logan’s investigation itself violated the PCA-like restrictions, it is irrelevant whether 
it was permissible for him to transfer to civilian authorities” the unearthed information. Id. at 833 n.11.  
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stop suspected drunk drivers in downtown Seattle on the off-chance that a driver 
is a member of the military.”118 
After finding that PCA-like restrictions were violated, the court next had to 
decide whether evidence resulting from the violation should have been excluded. 
The panel noted that, typically, an exclusionary rule is not applied except where 
a “need to deter future violations is demonstrated.”119 The court found such a 
need here based on evidence that “it has become a routine practice for the Navy 
to conduct surveillance of all the civilian computers in an entire state to see 
whether any child pornography can be found on them.”120 
Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain concurred in finding that the Navy’s PCA-like 
restrictions had been violated, but dissented with regard to applying the 
exclusionary rule.121 He emphasized that the remedy is generally disfavored 
because it can result in the release of an otherwise convicted criminal.122 The 
dissent noted that application of the rule in the context of the PCA was 
unprecedented for any federal court and was particularly disturbing given that 
the criminal who would benefit was engaged in child pornography.123 
Application of the exclusionary rule in the context of the PCA is only 
warranted where there is evidence of “widespread and repeated violations,” and 
absent its application, future violations will not be deterred.124 The dissent found 
such evidence lacking, noting that it amounted to “anecdotal evidence” that 
“four agents committed violations—three of whom were part of the same 
investigative team.”125 In contrast to the dissent’s opposition to the application 
of the exclusionary rule to benefit a criminal involved with child pornography, 
Judge Andrew Kleinfeld joined the court’s opinion and then concurred 
separately to expand upon the egregious nature of the government’s conduct: 
through its surveillance, the military “peeked into every computer in the State” 
in what amounted to “repeated invasions of Washingtonians’ privacy.”126 
 
 118 Id. at 834. 
 119 Id. at 839 (quoting United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 120 Id. at 836. 
 121 Id. at 842 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 122 Id. at 839 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The rule’s ‘bottom-line effect, in 
many cases, is to suppress the truth and set the criminal loose in the community without punishment.’” (quoting 
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 (2011))). 
 123 Id. at 838, 840.  
 124 Id. at 836–37.  
 125 Id. at 841 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 126 Id. at 837–38 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring).  
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In other words, it seems likely the panel result was driven more by the court’s 
concern about the state-wide surveillance undertaken than by the threat of 
military intrusion upon civilian affairs. The court, after all, did not reach the 
question of whether it was improper for the NCIS to pass information gleaned 
about private citizens to the civilian authorities. The conduct requiring 
deterrence was the use of a computer program that allowed law enforcement to, 
as Judge Kleinfeld put it, “hack[]” computers state-wide.127 
The dissent, expressing strong disapproval over the cost of the deterrence—
potentially freeing someone trafficking in child pornography and thus 
potentially aiding the victimization of children—further underscores the drastic 
nature of the court’s action. Judge Kleinfeld’s concurrence, however, rejoins to 
point out not only that the military, through such searches, is effectually “acting 
as a national police force,”128 but also that there is a widespread invasion of 
privacy at issue here—an issue that is really separate from the concern that the 
military is overstepping the bounds Congress set for it.129 
The en banc Ninth Circuit differed from the panel in terms of whether the 
exclusionary remedy was warranted but in important respects affirmed key 
aspects of the panel decision as relates to cybersurveillance. The court again 
found Logan had violated PCA-like restrictions on the Navy and again located 
the source of that violation in terms of the initial search, which because “the 
computer query employed . . . was in no way limited members of the 
military.”130 In other words “the methodology NCIS employed . . . clearly 
violated” the PCA-like restrictions on the Navy.131 
The en banc court was more cautious about whether the violations were 
widespread and in the end attributed them to “institutional confusion” about 
what the PCA-like restrictions on the Navy required.132 That in turn would allow 
the court to conclude suppression was not warranted since, the court reasoned, 
the Government should be given an opportunity to “self-correct” and conform 
to the law before application of such a harsh rule.133 
 
 127 Id. at 838. 
 128 Id. at 837.  
 129 Id. 
 130 United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1276 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 1280.  
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The decision was not a victory for either Dreyer or the government, and 
reflects the original panel’s concern with cybersurveillance. In challenging the 
panel’s resort to the exclusionary rule, the government argued, and the court 
agreed, that application of the exclusionary rule is normally restricted to 
deterring constitutional violations or violations of statutes enforcing 
constitutional norms.134 The Ninth Circuit, however, then held that the PCA was 
a statute grounded in the Constitution.135 The court did not identify a specific 
amendment to justify this. But, rather, the courts discovered its constitutional 
basis in a general structural argument. The court relied upon the constitutional 
separation of the military and civilian spheres, citing to a Supreme Court case 
which identified the Third Amendment’s prohibition on quartering troops in 
civilian homes as reflecting a broader desire to preclude military intrusion 
(specifically military surveillance) on civilian activities.136 
The result of Dreyer is that the Ninth Circuit reserved the right to invoke the 
exclusionary rule and preserved the remedy of excluding evidence resulting 
from military computer monitoring in the future. Moreover, pragmatically 
speaking, by declining to suppress evidence on the facts before it, the court 
insulated a potentially shaky holding that the PCA (and therefore the Navy’s 
PCA-like restrictions) have constitutional underpinnings. As disturbing as the 
sweeping nature of military cybersurveillance was to the panel and the en banc 
court, the panel dissent made clear that allowing someone involved in child 
pornography to go free was equally disturbing—and such bad facts could 
potentially lead to unfavorable Supreme Court review.137 
In Dreyer, the PCA-like restrictions applicable to the Navy provided the 
Ninth Circuit with the legal hook it needed to curb the Navy’s state-wide 
surveillance. However, neither Dreyer nor the PCA prevent the same kind of 
surveillance from being undertaken by civilian authorities. Moreover, the PCA 
will not stop comparable programs from migrating from foreign military to 
domestic law enforcement use. Domestic applications may be put into play by 
civilian authorities asserting that these surveillance programs offer governing 
efficiencies that make them worthwhile. Yet, the legal framework to limit them 
and their potential intrusion of constitutional rights and privacy in general 
remains in need of being theorized. 
 
 134 Id. at 1277–78. 
 135 Id. at 1279. 
 136 Id. at 1279 n.7 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972)). 
 137 United States v. Dreyer, 767 F.3d 826, 840–41 (9th Cir. 2014) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  
HU GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/22/2017 2:15 PM 
722 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:697 
As seen in Dreyer, with the tools of cybersurveillance at his disposal, a Naval 
intelligence agent deployed those tools against all citizens in an entire state. With 
cybersurveillance, surveillance is not designed to pursue and monitor suspects 
but rather to unearth them in the first place, separating them out from the general 
populace. Thus, in the case of RoundUp, the general populace of an entire 
geographic area, here the State of Washington, was subjected to 
cybersurveillance. Increasingly, according to the theorizing of Balkin and 
Levinson, traditional “rule of law” protocols will follow the secret law protocols 
of the National Surveillance State.138 Thus, the kind of efficiency at play in 
Dreyer is precisely why the military’s surveillance programs abroad deserve the 
attention of scholars. 
The Dreyer illustration does not involve a biometric database with a 
biometric anchor. Rather, the anchor in that case was an IP address. That fact, 
however, does not diminish Dreyer’s illustrative value, as local law enforcement 
officers may have been tasked with collecting the defendant’s biometrics 
pursuant to procedure.139 At the time of Dreyer’s arrest, biometric data (e.g., 
fingerprints and digital photo) may have been harvested under normal law 
enforcement protocols, which often require sharing local biometric databases 
with federal law enforcement and homeland security agencies. 
Additionally, Washington State mandates DNA collection for individuals 
convicted of certain felony sexual offenses, including being required to register 
as a sex offender.140 Members of the Washington legislature have attempted to 
extend this law to encompass all felony arrestees since 2011.141 All state 
databanks can be used for law enforcement officials investigating sex crimes.142 
The FBI maintains a national DNA database, “containing the DNA profiles 
contributed by federal, state, and local participating forensic laboratories.”143 In 
sum, a civilian, such as Dreyer, who was not intended to be the target of the 
intelligence gathering, may nonetheless find himself ensnared in the architecture 
 
 138 See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 23, at 4–5.  
 139 Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 828. 
 140 See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.754 (2015) (identifying crimes triggering DNA collection, the collection 
procedure, and penalties for noncompliance).  
 141 See Deborah Wang, Supreme Court Decision Revives Washington State Debate over DNA Collection, 
KUOW.ORG (June 4, 2013), http://kuow.org/post/supreme-court-decision-revives-washington-state-debate-
over-dna-collection.  
 142 Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 767, 780 (1999). 
 143 Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/ 
biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). 
HU GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/22/2017 2:15 PM 
2017] BIOMETRIC CYBERINTELLIGENCE 723 
of biometric cybersurveillance, by virtue of his data being potentially 
indefinitely stored in the databases of FBI and Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), and perhaps the databases of other intelligence agencies—
regardless of the final disposition of his case. 
II. BIOMETRIC CYBERINTELLIGENCE 
It is not readily apparent how the military and intelligence communities 
convert biometric-enabled intelligence into actionable intelligence through mass 
biometric cybersurveillance, nor is it obvious how biometric data can be 
exploited for drone weaponry and other targeted killing technologies. It is 
apparent, however, that biometric data is being actively collected. According to 
one report, in fact, “[t]he stated goal of the Afghan [biometric data collection] 
effort is no less than the collection of biometric data for every living person in 
Afghanistan.”144 
According to a 2012 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
“[i]n Afghanistan, the U.S. military is using more than 7,000 electronic devices 
to collect biometrics data in the form of fingerprints, iris scans, and facial 
photographs.”145 Additionally, “[f]rom 2004 to 2011, U.S. military forces 
collected biometrics data in the form of over 1.6 million [biometric] enrollments
involving more than 1.1 million persons in Afghanistan, and used biometrics to 
successfully identify approximately 3,000 known enemy combatants.”146 
This Part explicates to what end is served by biometric-enabled intelligence. 
In Part II.A, the biometric cyberintelligence process is explained as beginning 
with the collection of biometric data and proceeds with its fusion with 
“contextual” data also collected from the target population. The result is 
actionable intelligence. Although biometric-enabled intelligence is often 
characterized by the military and intelligence community as the familiar and 
routinized collection of biometric data, such as fingerprints and DNA, to 
enhance identity information analysis (e.g., a fingerprint or DNA database to 
facilitate the government’s attempt to identify a potential criminal suspect or 
terrorist), private contractor proponents are more enthusiastic about its potential. 
 
 144 Identity Dominance: The U.S. Military’s Biometric War in Afghanistan, PUB. INTELLIGENCE (Apr. 21, 
2014) [hereinafter Identity Dominance], https://publicintelligence.net/identity-dominance/. 
 145 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-442, DEFENSE BIOMETRICS: ADDITIONAL TRAINING 
FOR LEADERS AND MORE TIMELY TRANSMISSION OF DATA COULD ENHANCE THE USE OF BIOMETRICS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 1 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590311.pdf. 
 146 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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To that end, this Part summarizes in detail the potential of biometric-enabled 
intelligence as portrayed by Booz Allen Hamilton, a government contractor on 
the forefront of biometric surveillance tactics and techniques. 
The new forms of mass biometric data collection and analysis are unfolding 
at the dawn of a big data world. The biometric-driven forms of identity 
verification and determination now deployed in the civil, criminal, military, and 
intelligence contexts, therefore, are uniquely cyber-driven as these sectors 
attempt to harness the promise of newly emerging big data tools. Further, the 
collection of biometric data by the military and intelligence communities does 
not lead to static storage, as in a small data context (e.g., collection of fingerprint 
files in paper form and storing such files in filing cabinets). In the big data 
context, the storage and subsequent analysis of biometric data, including the 
linkage of biometric identifiers with other database screening and pattern 
analysis under data analytics, can lead to military and intelligence 
decisionmaking. 
Domestically, these techniques are often referred to under the rubric of 
“identity management.” In the context of military operations abroad, they are 
characterized as “population management.” Part II.B discusses both. It focuses 
on how biometric data collection and analysis are increasingly executed through 
biometric National ID systems. Part II.C briefly considers the most aggressive 
aim of biometric-enabled intelligence: “identity dominance.” Part II.D explains 
that identity dominance through identity management and population 
management incentivizes the burgeoning of interoperable biometric databases 
and bureaucracies attempting to coordinate biometric cybersurveillance and 
biometric cyberintelligence strategies. 
A. Identity Intelligence and Biometric-Enabled Intelligence 
At the time of the NSA surveillance disclosures, it was revealed that Edward 
Snowden was employed as a contractor for the NSA at a private corporation, 
Booz Allen Hamilton,147 which refers to itself as a “strategy and technology 
consulting” firm.148 Booz Allen describes itself as “a leading provider of 
 
 147 Marjorie Censer, Booz CEO: Snowden ‘Was Not a Booz Allen Person’, WASH. POST (July 31, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/capitalbusiness/booz-ceo-snowden-was-not-a-booz-allen-person/ 
2013/07/31/a349b51a-f9f6-11e2-8752-b41d7ed1f685_story.html. Censer explains, “Booz Allen, which is 
majority-owned by private equity firm Carlyle Group, was thrust into the spotlight after Snowden acknowledged 
being the source of news reports about National Security Agency data-collection programs.” Id. 
 148 Booz Allen at a Glance, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, http://investors.boozallen.com/glance.cfm (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2016).  
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management consulting, technology, and engineering services to the U.S. 
government in defense, intelligence, and civil markets.”149 As a contractor 
seeking business with U.S. intelligence agencies, Booz Allen does what the 
military and other branches typically will not: pitches the way biometric 
intelligence can be put to proactive and preemptive uses.150 
To better understand “identity intelligence” and “biometric-enabled 
intelligence,” as terms of art in the defense and intelligence community 
vernacular, the Booz Allen website is informative. Booz Allen features a 
promotional page titled, “Identity/Biometrics Enabled Intelligence.”151 In 
another promotional publication, Booz Allen includes references to biometric 
and forensic identification technologies.152 Booz Allen describes this identity 
intelligence as “authoritative information [that] adds a powerful new evidentiary 
source that can drive intelligence estimates and predictions.”153 According to 
Booz Allen, this process involves the full integration of biometrics “into the 
traditional intelligence analysis cycle,” allowing for “raw biometric 
information” to be “fused with contextual information to produce useful and 
actionable intelligence.”154 
The Booz Allen description is consistent with the official policy of the U.S. 
Department of Defense, which also emphasizes the need to integrate biometrics 
and forensics into intelligence activities in order to support “the full range of 
military operations.”155 “BEI [biometric-enabled intelligence] and FEI 
[forensic-enabled intelligence] shall be fully integrated into Defense Intelligence 
and the Defense Intelligence Component activities as an essential element of 
 
 149 Id.  
 150 See, e.g., Grey Burkhart, Predictive Intelligence: The Critical Connection Between Intentions and 
Capabilities, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, http://www.boozallen.com/insights/2013/04/predictive-intelligence-the-
critical-connection-between-intentions-and-capabilities (last visited Oct. 27, 2016) (“Predictive intelligence is 
one critical component of a holistic cybersecurity strategy that encompasses all the people, process, and 
technology facets of a dynamic defense posture to anticipate, prioritize, and mitigate cyber threats.”).  
 151 Identity/Biometrics Enabled Intelligence, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON (Jan. 30, 2015) (on file with the 
author). 
 152 Next-Generation Biometrics and Forensics: Moving Biometrics to the Tactical Edge, BOOZ ALLEN 
HAMILTON, http://www.boozallen.com/content/dam/boozallen/media/file/next-generation-biometrics-and-
forensics.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).  
 153 Identity/Biometrics Enabled Intelligence, supra note 151.  
 154 Id. 
 155 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. O-3300.04, DEFENSE BIOMETRIC ENABLED INTELLIGENCE (BEI) 
AND FORENSIC ENABLED INTELLIGENCE (FEI) 2 (2012), https://publicintelligence.net/dod-biometric-
intelligence.  
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national security and in support of the full range of military operations consistent 
with national, defense, and operational priorities.”156 
Booz Allen’s full description of “identity intelligence” is as follows: 
When biometrics and forensics are fully integrated with other 
intelligence disciplines and the intelligence analysis process, this 
authoritative identity information adds a powerful new evidentiary 
source that can drive intelligence estimates, predictions, and products. 
To turn disparate pieces of biometric data into meaningful analytics 
and substantive intelligence, raw biometric data (e.g., fingerprints, face 
images, iris & retina scans, voice signals, 3D full-body scans, latent 
forensic data, video & multimedia signals, among other data) is fused 
with other raw intelligence and contextual information to produce 
useful and actionable intelligence products. In a well-governed 
biometric-enabled intelligence organization, well-trained analysts use 
biometric case management tools, enterprise-class infrastructure, 
proven tools and techniques, and established processes to support 
mission-critical activities. 157 
Before biometric data can support intelligence analytics, a number of steps 
must occur. The biometric data must first be collected, and then it must be fused 
with broader contextual data about the biography of individuals based on their 
data trails. Booz Allen discusses the end product of this process, “biometric-
enabled intelligence,” in the following manner: 
Biometric Enabled intelligence has quickly become an accepted tool 
for solving high-priority identity problems. Biometric information 
exhibits an inherent reliability, whether it is collected overtly or 
covertly. Biometric identity data is readily indexed, processed, and 
retrieved. Intelligence analysts and law enforcement personnel use it 
as the central criteria to establish identity and as a basis to recommend 
action.158 
In other words, biometric-enabled intelligence provides more than a library 
of data to be consulted after a crime has occurred. When fused with contextual 
information, it allows intelligence agencies to become proactive—to make 
appropriate interventions based on predictive analytics. Booz Allen further 
explains the objectives of biometric-enabled intelligence: “Intelligence 
 
 156 Id. 
 157 Identity/Biometrics Enabled Intelligence, supra note 151. 
 158 Id. 
HU GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/22/2017 2:15 PM 
2017] BIOMETRIC CYBERINTELLIGENCE 727 
Communities use biometric-enabled intelligence in new strategic and tactical 
applications to proactively exploit biometric & forensic data[:]” 
• “Can a person be matched to a place, activity or device?”159 
• “Can faces in the crowd be linked to other intelligence information?”160 
• “Can persons, objects, or other entities be linked?”161 
• “Is the presence of multiple people in the same location an event of 
interest?”162 
• “Can movement patterns b[e] anticipated exploited?”163 
• “Can we predict the intent of a person or organization?”164 
• “How does biometric and identity intelligence impact our strategic 
execution?”165 
Booz Allen also offers an array of tactics, techniques, and tools that can be 
deployed to “exploit the rich potential of biometric-enabled intelligence[:]”166 
• “Searching, analyzing, and mining biometric, identity, and forensic 
information”;167 
• “Using biometrics to create and enhance intelligence products”;168 
• “Implementing enterprise-class infrastructure to store and process 
biometric intelligence”;169 
• “Using biometric and identity linkages to establish attribution and 
identify risks”;170 
 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Id. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. 
 168 Id. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
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• “Identifying patterns in biometric and identity data”;171 
• “Supporting social and relational network analysis of 
criminal/terrorist/insurgent/foreign country intelligence networks”;172 
• “Communicating threats in real time”;173 
• “Tracking, monitoring, and cleansing identity information”;174 
• “Implementing novel biometric recognition technology to solve urgent 
and challenging ID problems”;175 
• “Integrating off-the-shelf technologies to create highly functional 
enterprise infrastructure”;176 
• “Building in-house biometric/identity expertise”;177 
• “Sharing biometric and identity data with customers and 
stakeholders”;178 
• “Creating new tactics, techniques, tools, processes, and standards”;179 
• “Applying techniques and analytics to identity-enabled 
intelligences.”180 
To better understand how Booz Allen is able to translate “raw biometric data” 
into, as they term it, “useful and actionable intelligence,” it is important to ask 
exactly how “raw biometric data” is “fused with . . . contextual information.”181 
Booz Allen explains that it possesses the capacity to “synthesize information 
from multiple . . . intelligence sources.”182 
 
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. Booz Allen describes its methodology in full as follows:  
Booz Allen applies an intelligence perspective to the challenges of protection mitigation. Rather 
than focus on narrow, biometric-specific identification technologies, our methodology delivers the 
ability to define the value of disparate biometrics based on match quality and source reliability to 
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In the identity-management technology vernacular, “contextual information” 
is both very specific and very ambiguous. It is specific because it is seeking 
biographical information and information that detects individual characteristics 
(e.g., specific product preferences and Internet behavior patterns) that can form 
the basis of an accurate personal data profile. It is ambiguous because it is 
universal in nature and can involve the capture of limitless categories of 
biometric, biographical, and behavioral data. 
 The rise of the Internet in the 1990s allowed for more sophisticated research 
into the profiling of individuals as consumers of products (e.g., online purchases) 
and users of technology (e.g., Internet browsing) through the development of 
methods, tools, and techniques for “context in Information Access, Seeking and 
Retrieval,” and evaluation.183 Through complex algorithms that attempt to 
account for idiosyncratic anomalies and other factors of scientific instability 
(e.g., the reliability of data may be environment-dependent), daily advances in 
screening technologies have resulted in attempts to capture and then predict 
consumer tastes and technological user preferences and habits with more and 
more accuracy. Contextual information relies on the “access, seeking and 
retrieval” of biographical and informational choice data that can be obtained 
from the Internet, social-networking site activity, cell phones, GPS devices, 
personal databases, and publicly-available government databases.184 In lay 
terms, contextual information can include:  
 
extract biometric-derived information as it applies to a unique mission. It also allows us to 
synthesize information from multiple intelligence sources to deliver to our clients the specific 
information they want and the certainty that they need.  
Id. 
 183 CIRSE 2009: ECIR 2009 Workshop on Contextual Information Access, Seeking and Retrieval 
Evaluation, WIKICFP (Apr. 6, 2009) http://www.wikicfp.com/cfp/servlet/event.showcfp?eventid=4394 
&copyownerid=320; see also, e.g., MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 6. The President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology states: 
Individually, each data source may have a specific, limited purpose. Their combination, however, 
may uncover new meanings. In particular, data fusion can result in the identification of individual 
people, the creation of profiles of an individual, and the tracking of an individual’s activities. More 
broadly, data analytics discovers patterns and correlations in large corpuses of data, using 
increasingly powerful statistical algorithms. If those data include personal data, the inferences 
flowing from data analytics may then be mapped back to inferences, both certain and uncertain, 
about individuals. 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. AND TECH., supra note 27, at x; see also Azin Ashkan et al., 
Classifying and Categorizing Query Intent, in ADVANCES IN INFORMATION RETRIEVAL: 31TH EUROPEAN 
CONFERENCE ON IR RESEARCH, ECIR 2009, at 578, 578 (Mohand Boughanem et al. eds., 2009). 
 184 Ms. Smith, Microsoft’s Davis on Privacy: Your Digital Life Data Is Bankable Currency, NETWORK 
WORLD (Sept. 1, 2010, 6:06 AM), http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/65750. 
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all locations that you go, all the purchases you ever make, all your 
relationships, all activity, all your health, governmental, employer, 
academic and financial records, your web search history, your 
calendars and appointments, all your phone calls, data, texts, email, all 
peoples connected to your social circle, all your personal interests, and 
all other personal data.185 
In one study, for example, contextual information allowed for the construction 
of a profile of an Internet user based on “user context.”186 By conducting a 
“semantic [word context] analysis” of all files accessed over the Internet, the 
experts sought to “construct an ontological user profile describing the users 
preferences based on the users context.”187 The software is then programmed to 
adapt the individual’s profile ontologically, or sort data based on the data’s and 
the user’s relationships with other data and other users with shared 
characteristics.188 The profile grows in its sophistication in ever greater degrees 
of predictive value through correlative evidence over a period of time, 
continuing to study Internet activity and other technological “log files” that are 
added to the profile over the years and comparing it with other reliable 
comparator data and users.189 Based on technological advances, therefore, the 
predictive analytics involving identity determinations can be made more 
accurate by not only comparing current behavioral patterns to prior behavioral 
patterns, but to others that are considered to be fair or similarly situated 
comparators within a target’s profile,190 including physiological and biometric 
information, which in turn includes “soft” biometric information (e.g., race, 
gender, skin color, etc.).  
This fusion of data and, more specifically, the synthesis of biometric data 
with “contextual information,” unfolds within a legal and administrative 
 
 185 Id. (discussing Partner Architect Marc Davis, Microsoft, Keynote Address at the Privacy Identity 
Innovation Conference (Aug. 18, 2010), https://vimeo.com/14401407 (“[A]ll the searches [you] do on Google 
or Bing or Yahoo, all the purchases [you] do on [your] credit cards, Amazon, [your] social graph on Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn, [your] address book and [your] call logs, . . . [your] interests, expressed explicitly and 
implicitly, where [you] have been [and] plan to go, [your] calendar, and the list goes on and on.”)). 
 186 Nazimuddin Mohammed, Trong Hai Duong & Geun Sik Jo, Contextual Information Search Based on 
Ontological User Profile, in COMPUTATIONAL COLLECTIVE INTELLIGENCE: TECHONOLOGIES AND 
APPLICATIONS, PART II 490, 491 (Jeng Shyang-Pan, Shyi-Ming Chen & Ngoc Thanh Nguyen eds., 2010). 
 187 Id. at 490; see also id. at 491 (“The ontological approach is a proven technique to model users and 
context in the field of information retrieval. . . . A new ontology can be created to represent a user’s general 
information, such as name, age, birth date, educational background, to more specific information describing the 
user’s interests.”). 
 188 Id. at 491–92. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
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architecture that supports it. For example, after the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, and throughout his presidency, President George W. Bush signed 
several dozen executive orders titled as “Homeland Security Presidential 
Directives” (HSPDs) or “National Security Presidential Directives” (NSPDs). 
Multiple presidential directives relate to biometric screening technology either 
implicitly or explicitly, such as HSPD-6,191 HSPD-11,192 HSPD-12,193 and 
NSPD-59/HSPD-24.194 HSPD-6 is titled “Integration and Use of Screening 
Information to Protect Against Terrorism,” and was signed by President Bush 
on September 16, 2003.195 HSPD-11 is titled “Comprehensive Terrorist-Related 
Screening Procedures” and was signed by President Bush on August 27, 2004.196 
HSPD-11 is complimented by HSPD-12, titled “Policy for a Common 
Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors.”197 HSPD-12 
was signed by President Bush on the same date as HSPD-11, August 27, 2004.198 
HSPD-12 specifies a policy for the issuance of a standard digitalized biometric 
identification card for federal employees and contractors.199 Implementing 
standards call for interoperable fingerprints to be used for interagency biometric 
verification purposes and permits federal agencies to utilize other biometrics for 
own-employee verification.200 
 
 191 Directive on Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism, HSPD-6, 2 
PUB. PAPERS 1174 (Sept. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Directive on Integration and Use], https://www. 
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pg1174.pdf (“It is the policy of the United States 
to (1) develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current information about individuals known or 
appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or 
related to terrorism (Terrorist Information) . . . .”). 
 192 Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures, HSPD-11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1763 (Aug. 27, 
2004), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2004-book2/pdf/PPP-2004-book2-doc-pg1763.pdf (“[I]t is the 
policy of the United States to: (a) enhance terrorist-related screening . . . through comprehensive, coordinated 
procedures that detect, identify, track, and interdict people, cargo, conveyances, and other entities and objects 
that pose a threat to homeland security . . . .”). 
 193 Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, HSPD-12, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1765 (Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter Policy for a Common Identification Standard], https://www.gpo. 
gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2004-08-30/pdf/WCPD-2004-08-30-Pg1709.pdf (“[I]t is the policy of the United States 
to enhance security, increase Government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by 
establishing a mandatory, Government-wide standard for secure and reliable forms of identification issued by 
the Federal Government to its employees and contractors (including contractor employees).”). 
 194 Directive on Biometrics, supra note 32. 
 195 Directive on Integration and Use, supra note 191. 
 196 Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures, supra note 192. 
 197 Policy for a Common Identification Standard, supra note 193. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id.  
 200 Implementation of HSPD-12 was promulgated through Federal Information Processing Standard 201 by 
the U.S. Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), which detailed 
guidelines for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) credentials. U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., HSPD-12—
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Perhaps most relevant to this Article, and as mentioned briefly in the 
Introduction, is a joint National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive signed by President George W. Bush on June 5, 
2008.201 Titled “Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance 
National Security,” NSPD-59/HSPD-24 directs the military and federal 
government to work collaboratively “to collect, store, use, analyze, and share 
biometrics to identify and screen KSTs [known and suspected terrorists].”202 
NSPD-59/HSPD-24 also directs the military and federal government “to collect, 
store, use, analyze, and share biometrics” of “other persons.”203 No further 
guidance is provided on how to limit this instruction beyond the mandate that 
the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometrics should be 
directed against those “who may pose a threat to national security.”204 Further, 
NSPD-59/HSPD-24 directs the executive branch to gather “biometric and 
associated biographic and contextual information of individuals in a lawful and 
appropriate manner, while respecting . . . privacy and other legal rights under 
United States law.”205 
NSPD-59/HSPD-24 appears to build upon existing identity-screening 
consolidation and coordination efforts put in motion by HSPD-6, HSPD-11, and 
HSPD-12. Specifically, it was intended to ensure that high-level identity 
screening programs are implemented throughout government.206 This directive 
does not impose biometric or database screening requirements on state, local, or 
tribal authorities, or on the private sector. The directive does, however, provide 
a policy justification and legal rationale for the collection, retention, or 
dissemination of personal information for identification and screening activities. 
 
ADVANCED FINGERPRINT RESULTS, NOTICE NO. 06-04 (June 8, 2006), https://www.opm.gov/investigations/ 
background-investigations/federal-investigations-notices/2006/fin06-04.pdf. “On August 5, 2005, the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) issued Memorandum M-05-24 ‘Implementation of [HSPD] 12—Policy for a 
Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors’ . . . . In March 2006, NIST issued 
FIPS 201-1, ‘Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors’ . . . .” Id. These 
guidelines identify a fingerprint-based background check as the bare minimum for a PIV credential. Id. For 
technical information about the implementation of HSPD-12, see About Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of 
Federal Employees and Contractors, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/ 
(last updated Aug. 16, 2016). 
 201 Directive on Biometrics, supra note 32. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
 206 Id. at 757–60. 
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And, as noted above, Official U.S. Department of Defense policy on 
biometric cyberintelligence requires the fusion of “BEI and FEI with associated 
contextual data and other available intelligence.”207 It appears from the guidance 
that the “contextual data and other available intelligence” may include 
intelligence gathered through the NSA.208 Specifically, the U.S. Department of 
Defense specifies multiple categories of available intelligence to be fused with 
biometric data: “[1] document and media exploitation, [2] signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), [3] human intelligence (HUMINT) . . . , and [4] counter human 
network operations that include counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, 
counterproliferation, counternarcotics, counterpiracy, and 
countersmuggling.”209 
Yet, experts agree that biometric use for military and intelligence 
decisionmaking is still a new field that relies upon experimental technologies.210 
“The general field or trade of identity intelligence . . . is in its infancy . . . .”211 
There are few guidelines that can assist in the verification of the reliability of 
biometrics and biometric-enabled intelligence. In fact, “the 2011 U.S. Army 
Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan states that there is ‘no formal 
doctrine; universally accepted tactics, techniques, and procedures; or 
institutionalized training programs across the Department of Defense’ for 
biometric capabilities.”212 
“Many gaps exist in our understanding of the nature and extent of 
distinctiveness and stability of biometric traits across individuals and groups.”213 
Experts caution that biometric technologies have not been tested for minimum 
efficacy levels when scaled to the volume of millions or billions of 
 
 207 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 155, at 2. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. The Department of Defense instructs that these types of intelligence should “support irregular warfare 
(IW) in accordance with [DoD policy] . . . .” Id. 
 210 GARFINKEL, supra note 15, at 55 (“Despite their apparent accuracy, neither fingerprints nor DNA 
samples are suitable for identifying individuals on a day-to-day basis.”); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-
03-174, TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT: USING BIOMETRICS FOR BORDER SECURITY 58–62 (2002), http://www.gao. 
gov/assets/160/157313.pdf (explaining the “[l]ack of [a]pplications-[d]ependent [e]valuations” that study the 
impact of biometric data usage in real-life contexts and summarizing studies showing “[s]usceptibility [of 
biometric technologies] to [d]eception”). In contrast, the usage of biometric data for forensic purposes has 
undergone more rigorous and lengthier testing, having been tested over several decades. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, 
supra note 15, at 59 (asserting that biometric recognition and verification technologies have not been subjected 
to the same scientific peer review process as that required of DNA fingerprinting). 
 211 Iannotta, supra note 24.  
 212 Identity Dominance, supra note 144. 
 213 BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 14, at 4. 
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individuals.214 “While biometric technology is currently available and is used in 
a variety of applications, questions remain regarding the technical and 
operational effectiveness of biometric technologies in large-scale 
applications.”215 
Although of only anecdotal value, for example, when reporting on 
Biometric-Enabled Intelligence efforts in Afghanistan, a reporter for the New 
York Times, “an American of Norwegian rather than Afghan extraction,” 
voluntarily submitted to biometric database screening with the U.S. military’s 
Biometric Automated Toolset (B.A.T.) system.216 “After his fingerprints and iris 
scans were entered into the B.A.T.’s armored laptop, an unexpected ‘hit’ popped 
up on the screen, along with the photograph of a heavily bearded Afghan.”217 
The biometric screening revealed the accuracy vulnerabilities that resulted in a 
false determination. “The ‘hit’ identified the reporter as ‘Haji Daro Shar 
Mohammed,’ who is on terrorist Watch List 4, with this note: ‘Deny Access, Do 
Not Hire, Subject Poses a Threat.’”218 
In optimal testing conditions, biometric data matching yields relatively 
accurate results. On a mass scale of hundreds of millions, however, a false yield 
rate of even one to five percent could result in the wrongful targeting of hundreds 
of thousands of individuals. On a mass scale of billions, a false yield rate of one 
to five percent could result in the wrongful targeting of millions of individuals. 
Nonetheless, such is the allure of biometrics and biometric intelligence that it is 
being actively employed to serve population management overseas and identity 
management domestically. 
B. Population Management and Identity Management: Biometrics and 
Contextual Information 
Biometric-enabled intelligence gathered and used domestically typically 
serves the purpose of “identity management,” a policy term of art that supports 
the sorting of individuals for various security-related purposes. However, in the 
context of the military, the term of art is “population management.” Both terms 
of art—“identity management” and “population management”—provide 
critically important policy rationales that explain, in part, the driving force that 
 
 214 See, e.g., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION, supra note 14, at 4–5.  
 215 VACCA, supra note 14, at 45. 
 216 Nordland, supra note 42. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
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may underlie the push to expand the mass collection of biometric data of entire 
populations and subpopulations.  
The term “population management” appears to be used by the U.S. military 
to explain and justify the collection of the biometrics and “contextual data” of 
“every living person in Afghanistan.”219 The 2011 U.S. Army Commander’s 
Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan has a section entitled “Population 
Management.”220 The Commander’s Guide reportedly outlines the goals of the 
military’s population management program: 
The Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan . . . encourages 
documenting as many Afghans as possible. “Every person who lives 
within an operational area should be identified and fully biometrically 
enrolled with facial photos, iris scans, and all 10 fingerprints (if 
present),” the guide says. (That was apparently a reference to 
Afghanistan’s many amputees.)221 
The 2011 U.S. Army Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan and 
other documents set forth the biometric data policy in Afghanistan: “[t]he stated 
goal of the Afghan [biometric data collection] effort is no less than the collection 
of biometric data for every living person in Afghanistan.”222 To demonstrate the 
military resources invested in executing this objective, it was reported that in 
one year, from November 2010 to November 2011, “12,000 [U.S.] soldiers [in 
Afghanistan] have been trained to use the B.A.T.”223 
Biometric data collection has been an essential aspect of the U.S. military’s 
ground operations in Afghanistan. “The biometric enrollment program in 
Afghanistan began in earnest in 2006. Since then, hundreds of thousands of 
biometric records have been ingested in both coalition and Afghan databases.”224 
Yet, at the same time, the U.S. military has been unable to develop 
comprehensive, multi-modal biometric databases (e.g., comprehensive 
combination of digital photographs, fingerprints, iris scans, DNA, etc.) of “every 
living person in Afghanistan” through militarized operations and intelligence-
gathering operations alone.225 “We can’t go door to door [to collect biometric 
 
 219 Identity Dominance, supra note 144. 
 220 Id. 
 221 Nordland, supra note 42. 
 222 Identity Dominance, supra note 144. 
 223 Nordland, supra note 42. 
 224 Pendall & Sieg, supra note 25, at 69.  
 225 See Nordland, supra note 42. 
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data],” explained one U.S. military leader in Afghanistan.226 As a result, 
according to one media report, “the military has not conducted wholesale sweeps 
of communities [in Afghanistan] to gather biometrics.”227 
It is not simply the collection of Afghani biometric data, however, that 
accomplishes the goals of population management. “The soldiers must also 
record ‘good contextual data’ about the individual such as ‘where they live, what 
they do, and to which tribe or clan they belong.’”228 In other words, as discussed 
in Part A, raw biometric data must be fused with extensive contextual data. 
Population management objectives include the collection, storage, and analysis 
of biometric data, biographic data, and behavioral data combined: 
A checklist included in the [‘Population Management’] section [of the 
2011 U.S. Army Commander’s Guide to Biometrics in Afghanistan] 
includes the following instructions: 
• Locate and identify every resident (visit and record every house 
and business). At a minimum, fully biometrically enroll all 
military-age males as follows: 
• Full sets of fingerprints. 
• Full face photo. 
• Iris scans. 
• Names and all variants of names. 
• BAT associative elements: 
• Address. 
• Occupation. 
• Tribal name. 
• Military grid reference of enrollment. 
• Create an enrollment event for future data mining. 
• Listen to and understand residents’ problems. 
• Put residents in a common database. 
• Collect and assess civil-military operations data. 
• Identify local leaders and use them to identify the populace. 
• Use badging to identify local leaders, and key personnel. 
• Cultivate human intelligence sources. 
• Push indigenous forces into the lead at every possible opportunity. 
• Track persons of interest; unusual travel patterns may indicate 
unusual activities.229 
 
 226 Id.  
 227 Id. 
 228 Identity Dominance, supra note 144.  
 229 Id. 
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The U.S. military has specifically created a “Biometrics Identity Management 
Agency,” later renamed the Defense Forensics and Biometrics Agency, within 
the U.S. Department of Defense to assist in the implementation of population 
management goals.230 
In the non-military context, the U.S. civilian government has structured 
identity management tools and programs that parallel the military’s population 
management tools and programs in ambition. Identity management tools 
deployed domestically, like the population management tools currently 
deployed abroad militarily, represent the fusion of biometric data, biographic 
data, and other contextual data as a method to inform homeland security 
decisionmaking. 
For instance, DHS offers this definition of “identity management“: 
Identity Management (IdM) is a broad administrative area that deals 
with identifying and managing individuals within a government, state, 
local, public, or private sector network or enterprise. In addition, 
authentication and authorization to access resources such as facilities 
or, sensitive data within that system are managed by associating user 
rights, entitlements, and privileges with the established identity.231 
As a policy prescription for a broad swath of homeland security objectives, 
identity management is presented as a broad umbrella that may encompass 
multiple goals: 
Identity management plays a critical role in a number of applications. 
Examples of such applications include regulating international border 
crossings, restricting physical access to important facilities like nuclear 
plants or airports, controlling logical access to shared [computerized 
and digitalized] resources and information, performing remote 
financial transactions, or distributing social welfare benefits.232 
Biometric experts have observed that multiple post-9/11 identity 
management programs have mandated the use of biometrics: 
For example, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform 
Act of 2002 . . . mandated the use of biometrics in the issue of U.S. 
 
 230 DEF. FORENSICS & BIOMETRICS AGENCY, http://www.dfba.mil (last updated June 11, 2015). 
 231 Identity Management and Data Privacy Technologies Project, CYBER SEC. RESEARCH & DEV. CTR. (on 
file with author). For an overview of identity management as a policy concept, see Lucy L. Thomson, Critical 
Issues in Identity Management—Challenges for Homeland Security, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 335 (2007). 
 232 See JAIN, ROSS & NANDAKUMAR, supra note 14, at 1; see also IDMANAGEMENT.GOV, 
http://www.idmanagement.gov (last visited Nov. 14, 2015). 
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visas. . . . [T]he US-VISIT program (United States Visitor and 
Immigration Status Indicator Technology) . . . validates the travel 
documents of foreign visitors to the United States based on 
fingerprints. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
has unanimously recommended that its member States use Machine 
Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs) that incorporate at least the 
face biometric (some combination of face, fingerprint and iris can also 
be used) for purposes of verifying the identity of the passport holder.233 
Multiple experts have suggested that biometrics are the key to national security 
and homeland security in that biometric data can implement more accurate 
identity management systems on a mass scale, allowing the identity screening 
of millions and potentially billions of individuals.234 
One option that many nations have adopted or considered adopting is a 
biometric-based identification card. For example, the adoption of a biometric-
based “national identity card” has been considered by the Afghanistan 
government.235 The efficacy of this would be to enable the U.S. military to 
encourage the Afghanistan government to conduct “biometric screening of the 
entire population” of Afghanistan through “the national identity card.”236 The 
“wholesale sweeps of communities to gather biometrics”237 can thus be 
implemented through civilian government structures without military or 
intelligence intervention. Yet, at the same time, the ability of the U.S. military 
and intelligence community to access such biometric data, if such access is 
allowed, puts such data at the service of identity intelligence, biometric-enabled 
intelligence, and biometric cyberintelligence objectives. 
An example of the military’s promotion abroad of foreign governments 
compiling biometric data on their own citizens can be found in a January 2014 
study published in National Defense University’s Joint Force Quarterly. The 
study concludes that security forces in Afghanistan should “[t]reat every event 
as a means to collect additional biometrics.”238 Specifically, the study finds that 
the Afghan National Security Court has obtained convictions in “almost every 
case where a biometric match has been made between the defendant and the 
 
 233 Id. 
 234 See id. at 1–2. 
 235 Rod Nordland, Afghanistan Has Big Plans for Biometric Data, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/world/asia/in-afghanistan-big-plans-to-gather-biometric-data.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Pendall & Sieg, supra note 25, at 74.  
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criminal instrument.”239 To be clear, the U.S. military is not alone in promoting 
the adoption of a national biometric identity card, so its motives are likely well-
intentioned. Already, as previously discussed, bureaucratized cybersurveillance 
systems increasingly incentivize the development of universal biometric 
databases of an entire citizenry, often through biometric-based national ID 
systems.240 The Snowden disclosures have revealed that the NSA and foreign 
intelligence community appear to rely upon biometric-based national ID systems 
for biometric data harvesting purposes.241 
Table 1 illustrates that there has been a growing movement internationally, 
particularly in the past decade, to implement digitalized biometric-based 
national ID systems. In the United States, this movement is often tied to 
comprehensive immigration reform proposals.242 Such systems allow for 
biometric data to be stored, screened, and analyzed across a spectrum of agencies 
for multiple purposes, including identity management systems that may include 
identity verification and determination programs, and identity inference 
programs.243 
Table 1. Nations Adopting Digitalized Biometric ID Systems 
 
Country Program  
Albania All Albanian citizens who are over 15 
years of age must have a biometric 
identity card that contains 
fingerprints, general biographic 
information, and a digital 
photograph.244 
 
Belgium Mandatory ID cards for those over the 
age of 12, which contains a chip that 
 
 239 Id. at 72. 
 240 Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 28, at 1543–44.  
 241 See, e.g., Risen & Poitras, supra note 31. 
 242 Hu, Biometric ID, supra note 28, at 1509–12. 
 243 Id. at 1508 tbl.5. 
 244 Albania: The Biometric Identity Card; Its Appearance, Use and the Biometric Data Stored on It; 
Requirements and Procedures to Obtain a Biometric Identity Card Within Albania; Whether It Can Be Replaced 
and Renewed from Abroad, Including Requirements and Procedures, REFWORLD (Sept. 22, 2011), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f5f1e0b2.html. 
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stores the photograph as biometric 
data.245 
 
Bulgaria Personal ID cards contain biometric 
data, including fingerprints.246 
 
Gabon Currently building a national 
biometric civil registry, which will be 
the primary registry for all forms of 
citizen identification, including 
national ID cards.247 
 
India The distribution of biometric resident 
ID cards, which contain a photograph, 
biometrics, and a 64 kb smart chip, is 
underway.248 
 
Indonesia  Electronic national ID card captures 
fingerprints, a photograph, and an iris 
scan; 118 million records are already 
stored in Indonesia’s databases.249 
 
 245 STATEWATCH, ID CARDS IN THE EU: CURRENT STATE OF PLAY (2010), http://www.statewatch.org/ 
analyses/no-107-national-ID-cards-questionnaire.pdf. 
 246 First Domestic ID Cards Issued in Bulgaria on Monday, NOVINITE.COM (Mar. 28, 2010, 6:46 PM), 
http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=114680. 
 247 Jill Jaracz, Gabon Selects Gemalto for Biometric National Registry, SECUREIDNEWS (Sept. 21, 2012), 
http://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/gabon-selects-gemalto-for-biometric-national-registry/?tag= 
biometrics&tag=Government_ID. 
 248 ET Bureau, Clash with Aadhar Cards Seen: Home Ministry’s I-Card Plan Too Lands in Trouble, ECON. 
TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013, 3:19 AM), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-02-02/news/ 
36703931_1_aadhaar-cards-id-cards-unique-identification-authority. Indian officials from the department of 
Food and Civil Supplies recently discovered that the deputy director of the department conspired with the 
biometric franchisee to create 150 fraudulent biometric ration cards. Bogus Ration Cards Created with 
Biometrics, DECCAN HERALD (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.deccanherald.com/content/304160/bogus-ration-cards-
created-biometrics.html; see also Rebecca Bowe, India’s Gargantuan Biometric Database Raises Big Questions, 
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 27, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/09/indias-gargantuan-biometric-
database-raises-big-questions (explaining that as of September 2012, India’s Unique Identity (UID) program 
“ha[d] amassed a database of 200 million Indian residents’ digital fingerprints, iris scans, facial photographs, 
names, addresses, and birthdates,” with a view to capturing this information for all 1.2 billion residents). 
 249 Andrew Hudson, Indonesia Close to Rolling Out Biometric-Based National IDCard Project, 
SECUREIDNEWS (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/indonesia-close-to-rolling-out-
ambitious-biometric-based-national-id-card-project/?tag=biometrics&tag=National_ID. The Indonesian 
government plans to use the e-KTP card for a variety of purposes such as “voter registration, passport issuance, 
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Italy  ID card contains a 32 kb contact chip 
and stores photograph and 
fingerprints.250 
 
Lithuania Electronic ID card contains facial 
image and two fingerprints.251 
Malaysia 
 
“[N]ational ID that uses biometric 
fingerprint recognition, smart card 
chips, and photo[graph]s.”252 
 
Mexico The Personal Identity Card for 
minors (ages 4 to 17) is embedded 
with records of iris images, 
fingerprints, and a photograph. As 
of May 2012, 4 million minors were 
enrolled in the program. The 
Mexican government is extending 
the ID cards to adults.253 
 
Mongolia New eID program requires that all 
citizens over 18 years old carry smart 
cards as their national ID. The card 
contains a microprocessor that 
manages personal data, including a 
digital photograph and fingerprints.254 
 
tax and financial applications.” Id.; see also Ellen Messmer, Indonesia Advances World’s Most Ambitious 
Biometric-Based National Identity Card Project, NETWORKWORLD (Sept. 20, 2012), 
http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=EE35F375-9C4F-08CE-E838D226571E442C. 
 250 STATEWATCH, supra note 245. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Biometric Uses, ALPHACARD, http://www.alphacard.com/id-cards/biometric-uses (last visited Nov. 14, 
2015). 
 253 Rebecca Bowe, 2012 in Review: Biometric ID Systems Grew Internationally. . . And So Did Concerns 
About Privacy, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 29, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/12/biometric-id-
systems-grew-internationally-2012-and-so-did-concerns-about-privacy; see also Gabriela Manuli, Despite 
Privacy Concerns, Mexico Continues Scanning Youth Irises for ID Cards, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 31, 
2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/despite-privacy-concerns-mexico-continues-scanning-youth-
irises-id-cards. 
 254 Zack Martin, Mongolia Taps Gemalto for National IDs, SECUREIDNEWS (Nov. 30, 2012), 
http://www.secureidnews.com/news-item/mongolia-taps-gemalto-for-national-ids/?tag=government. 
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Nepal Nepal is launching the first phase of a 
smart card national identification 
program that will begin by giving 
117,000 citizens smart cards 
embedded with personal data and a 
unique national ID number. The plan 
is to completely phase in the cards 
over the next 5 years.255 
 
Netherlands “[A]utomated border crossing system 
with photo, biometric iris recognition, 
and a smart card chip.”256 
 
Nigeria (National Identity 
Management Commission) 
National ID card and database uses 
biometrics, including photograph and 
fingerprints, and unique numbers for 
every individual.257 
 
Pakistan Multi-biometric national identity card, 
which includes a photograph and 
thumbprint, has been issued to 96% of 
the adult population.258 
 




National ID card containing biometric 
data (fingerprints and photograph) is 
 
 255 Govt to Distribute 117,000 Biometric IDs in Next 18 Months, MYREPÚBLICA (Aug. 17, 2016, 2:00 AM), 
http://www.myrepublica.com/news/3966. 
 256 Biometric Uses, supra note 252. 
 257 Nigeria: The Issuance of National Identity Cards After 2003; Description of the Card; Prevalence of 
False National ID Cards; Introduction of the New Card (2003–July 2008), REFWORLD (Aug. 5, 2008), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48d2237734.html. 
 258 Pakistan: Computerized National Identity Cards (CNICs), Including Overseas Identity Cards; Issuance 
Procedures, REFWORLD (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/510f9cef2.html. The 
Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) is required for various activities, including obtaining a passport or 
driver’s license, holding a job, registering to vote, using social services, and opening a bank account. Id. 
 259 Portuguese Citizen ID Card Roll Out Underway, BIOMETRIC TECH. TODAY, Feb. 2007, at 3. 
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mandatory for everyone 15 years of 
age or older.260 
Republic of Serbia 
 
Each citizen over the age of 16 must 
carry an identity card containing 
biographic and biometric data, 




“[S]ocial Security card with 
biometrics and a smart card chip for 
storing information.”262 
 
Sweden ID card contains a radiofrequency 
(RFID) chip for biometric data.263 
 
C. Identity Dominance and Big Data Cyberintelligence 
Like population management, “identity dominance” appears to be another 
term of art in the military and intelligence community. However, it has no 
domestic counterpart like identity management. This is not surprising given that 
identity dominance evokes an adverse relation to the population subject to the 
data collection and subsequent dominance. Specifically, it appears that identity 
dominance expresses a strategic military and intelligence goal of digital data 
dominance in the realm of biometric data and contextual information. Gregory 
Sieminski, Chief of the Identity Intelligence Division, National Ground 
Intelligence Center, U.S. Army, explained, “BEI has saved countless lives in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and helped our forces achieve identity dominance in 
demanding insurgency environments.”264 According to one media report, the 
U.S. military’s goal of identity dominance can be explained and rationalized this 
way: “By collecting vast amounts of information on the population of 
Afghanistan, . . . the U.S. military has sought to achieve identity dominance by 
 
 260 Senegal: The Procedures for Obtaining a Birth Bulletin and a National Identity Card, REFWORLD (Feb. 
27, 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469cd6997.html; see also Mariama Mary Fall Dia, UNHCR 
Distributes Biometric ID Cards to Refugees in Senegal, UN REFUGEE AGENCY (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://www.unhcr.org/508536389.html. 
 261 MINISTRY OF INTERIOR, REPUBLIC OF SERB., OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA, NO. 62/06, 
IDENTITY CARD LAW (2008). 
 262 Biometric Uses, supra note 252. 
 263 STATEWATCH, supra note 245. 
 264 Moruza, supra note 26. 
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undermining the fluid anonymity of terrorist and criminal networks and 
attaching permanent [biometrically-enabled] identities to malicious actors.”265 
Nevertheless, the U.S. Army, for instance, has pointed out the benefits of 
biometric-based identity dominance in Afghanistan that tracks the purported 
domestic homeland security advantages that appear to animate DHS’s expansion 
of biometric data collection within the United States through identity 
management rationales: 
[T]he commander of the U.S. Army’s Task Force Biometrics Col. 
Craig Osborne [explained] that the collection of biometric data is not 
simply about “identifying terrorists and criminals,” but that “it can be 
used to enable progress in society and has countless applications for 
the provision of services to the citizens of Afghanistan.” According to 
Osborne, biometrics provide the Afghan government with “identity 
dominance” enabling them to know who their citizens are and link 
actions with actors.266  
To further demonstrate the perceived holistic value of biometric data to the 
military, it is useful to refer to the U.S. Department of Defense’s instructional 
guidelines on biometric-enabled intelligence, titled “Defense Biometric Enabled 
Intelligence (BEI) and Forensic Enabled Intelligence (FEI).”267 The instructional 
guidelines explain that “[i]n addition to the traditional intelligence cycle 
functions, BEI and FEI shall: (1) Collect, digitize, and transmit biometric data 
at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.”268 Therefore, identity 
dominance—as executed through biometric data collection and analysis—is 
purported to advance multiple benefits at all levels of military decisionmaking: 
tactical, operational, and strategic. 
Specifically, “[o]ver the last decade, biometrics has been put to use for 
improvised explosive device forensics and for identifying and targeting 
suspected insurgents and terrorists.”269 According to official U.S. government 
reports and representations, biometric-enabled intelligence allows for the 
military to make more informed operational and tactical decisionmaking in the 
following ways: 
 
 265 Identity Dominance, supra note 144. 
 266 Id. 
 267 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 155. Preceding this document, the media outlet states: “The following 
instruction is part of a series of ‘limited release’ DoD doctrine publications that are not released to the public.” 
(U//FOUO) DoD Instruction: Biometric Enabled Intelligence (BEI) and Forensic Enabled Intelligence (FEI), 
PUB. INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 10, 2013), http://publicintelligence.net/dod-biometric-intelligence/.  
 268 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 155, at 2. 
 269 Iannotta, supra note 24. 
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Incident tracking and analysis will discern patterns and enable better 
planning for security operations. Units should never enter an area for 
targeting raids, deliberate detentions, or clearance operations without 
knowing who they will likely encounter. . . . The BEI-based process of 
developing biometric named areas of interest allows units at all levels 
to pull the known entities from the database and plot them (by site of 
enrollment or by associated event location) on the operations graphic 
as an overlay. Units can review the density of previously enrolled 
individuals, review in aggregate or by individual, assess threats based 
on matches to security incidents, and better predict where these 
individuals are likely to be ahead of the operation, especially when 
they integrate the biometrics with other all-source intelligence as part 
of the intelligence preparation.270 
Consequently, the U.S. military explains that biometrics is an essential tool 
for the warfighter.271 “U.S. military officials say biometrics have become a 
useful battlefield tool in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . .”272 Since 2010, the Defense 
Forensics and Biometrics Agency (DFBA) has been in the process of being 
converted from a temporary task force to a permanent component of the U.S. 
Department of Defense.273 DFBA (then BIMA) explains: “This transformation 
reflects both the successes biometrics have had in supporting the warfighter and 
protecting our country and allies from terrorism and the vision of what 
biometrics can bring to the DoD in the future.”274 This has led at least one 
military official, Air Force General Victor Renuart, to announce that more 
biometric data collection is needed domestically, apparently, in part, to assist the 
military in its war effort abroad: “‘Interestingly, we are probably further forward 
in using biometrics outside our country in some of the combat environments than 
we are inside our country,’ said the general. ‘We’ve got to find a way to fix 
that.’”275 
Biometric-enabled intelligence is gaining widespread acceptance as an 
essential battlefield tool by the U.S. military. But the fields of biometric-enabled 
 
 270 Pendall & Sieg, supra note 25, at 74 (emphasis omitted). 
 271 BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009, Director’s Message at 1, 
https://fas.org/man/eprint/biometric09.pdf. 
 272 Biometric System Working in Afghanistan, UNITED PRESS INT’L (July 14, 2011, 10:03 AM), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/07/14/Biometric-system-working-in-Afghanistan/UPI-7414131065 
2220/. 
 273 BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 271, Director’s Message at 1. As noted above, BIMA was renamed 
the Defense Forensics and Biometric Agency in 2013. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.  
 274 Id. 
 275 Nathan Hodge, General Wants to Scan More U.S. Irises, Fingerprints, WIRED (Jan. 29, 2009, 2:00 PM) 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/01/biometrics-need/. 
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intelligence and biometric cyber intelligence are still emerging in the traditional 
intelligence community.276 “Biometrics has evolved dramatically during the Iraq 
and Afghanistan conflicts, . . . but the discipline has not been fully 
institutionalized into the intelligence community.”277 One military specialist 
explained that “[a]s BEI tradecraft is spread beyond its current wartime origins, 
more and more Army intelligence analysts are learning the power of fusing 
biometrics data with other, more traditional sources of intelligence.”278 “The 
intelligence community is pushing to make biometrically enabled intelligence—
the art of identifying people by fingerprints, digital mugshots, iris scans or 
DNA—a regular part of business.”279 
D. Interoperable Biometric Databases and the Bureaucracy of Biometric Data 
Management 
To achieve the goals of identity management and population management, 
the cybersurveillance strategy must be comprehensive in scope. Therefore, the 
data must be shared and exploited across multiple domains. For example, when 
the U.S. military collects biometric data for one purpose, it is shared with other 
databases. “Gathering the data does not stop at Afghanistan’s borders, . . . since 
the military shares all of the biometrics it collects with the United States 
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security through 
interconnected databases.”280 Once the data is captured and analyzed, it is 
difficult to protect against potential data breaches and data compromises, as well 
as potential data abuses and data privacy violations.281 Other issues include 
interoperability between platforms, data quality at the time of biometric capture, 
and other variables that may ultimately impact the integrity of the data screening 
or data analysis. 
Table 2 shows that within the U.S. and internationally, multiple agencies and 
bureaucracies have emerged in the past decade to manage the flow of biometric 
data: the capture, storage, and analysis of biometrics for identity management 
and population management goals. Increasingly, these goals integrate the 
objectives of the military and intelligence community. 
 
 276 Iannotta, supra note 24. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Moruza, supra note 26 (quoting Specialist Kama Mountz, 500th Military Intelligence Brigade). 
 279 Iannotta, supra note 24. 
 280 Nordland, supra note 42. 
 281 BENJAMIN WITTES, BROOKINGS INST. DATABUSE: DIGITAL PRIVACY AND THE MOSAIC 18 (2011), 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/databuse-digital-privacy-and-the-mosaic/. 
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Table 2. Examples of Bureaucracies Managing and Sharing Biometric Data 
 
Program Agency Purpose 







DoD/U.S. Army Permanent agency that 
“represents the synthesis 
of Department of 
Defense (DoD) 
capabilities in forensics 
and biometrics.”283 Also 




Biometric Center of 
Excellence (BCOE) 
FBI Created in 2007 to support 
the FBI’s overall 
biometric mission by 







National Institute of 
Standards and 
Technology (NIST) 
To assist both the U.S. 
government and private 
sector by “[s]upporting 




Subcommittee of the 
National Science 
The White House 
(Office of Science and 
Technology Policy) 
“[S]hapes national efforts 
and coordinates with 
Federal agencies that 
 
 282 DFBA FAQs, DEF. FORENSICS & BIOMETRICS AGENCY, http://www.dfba.mil/About/faqs.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 283 Id. 
 284 According to the DoD, “[t]he DoD Biometrics Enterprise will change focus from primarily being a 
‘Wartime’ need to ‘Peacetime’ activities.” BIOMETRICS IDENTITY MGMT. AGENCY, DOD BIOMETRICS 
COLLABORATION FORUM 9 (2011), http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a550048.pdf. 
 285 About the Biometric Center of Excellence, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-
other-biometrics/biometric-center-of-excellence/about-the-biometric-center-of-excellence (last visited Nov. 14, 
2016). 
 286 Biometric Standards Program and Resource Center, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., 
http://www.nist.gov/itl/csd/scm/biometric-standards.cfm (last updated Sept. 21, 2016). 
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and Technology 
Counsel (NSTC) 
have an interest in 
biometrics. . . . [And] 
dedicated to finding the 
best ways to achieve 
realtime identification 











Created in 2002 to 
“integrate advanced 
technologies and 
accelerate their transition 








DoD Provides strategic 
guidance to the Common 
Access Card (CAC) 
program, the Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) 






DHS “[F]ocal point for intra-
departmental planning 
and coordination on 
biometrics RDT&E 
[research, development, 
testing, and evaluation] 
and deployment to 
operational end-users.”290 
 
 287 Biometrics, NAT’L INST. JUSTICE, http://www.nij.gov/topics/technology/biometrics/welcome.aspx (last 
updated Sept. 15, 2011). 
 288 REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE TERRORISM INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAM 1 (2003) 
http://epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/may03_report.pdf. 
 289 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NO. 1000.25, DOD PERSONNEL IDENTITY PROTECTION (PIP) 
PROGRAM (2016), http://www.cac.mil/docs/DoDI-1000.25.pdf. 
 290 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11 (2008), http://www. 
biometrics.gov/Documents/Biometrics%20in%20Government%20Post%209-11.pdf. 
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Office of Consular 
Systems and 
Technology (CST) 
DoS Manages biometrics for 
Department of State 
programs such as the 
Consular Consolidated 
Database (CCD) and the 




of the National 
Institute of Justice 
(NIJ) 
DOJ Participates in the 
Biometrics 
Subcommittee of the 
National Science and 
Technology Council; 
some of the NIJ’s 
research priorities are 
confirming the identity of 
individuals, identifying 
individuals based on 
surveillance, and the 
collection of biometrics 
in field environments.292 
 
Biometrics Institute Independent 
organization (over 190 
members worldwide 
from public sector, 
private sector, and 
academia)293 
“[T]o promote the 
responsible use of 
biometrics as an 
independent and 
impartial international 
forum for biometric users 




 291 Alex Olesker, Department of State’s Consular Systems and Technology: A Track Record of Innovation, 
CTOVISION.COM (Oct. 7, 2011), http://ctovision.com/2011/10/department-of-states-consular-systems-and-
technology-a-track-record-of-innovation/. 
 292 Biometrics, supra note 287. 
 293 List of Members, BIOMETRICS INST., http://www.biometricsinstitute.org/pages/list-of-members.html 
(last visited Nov. 14, 2016). 
 294 Mission, BIOMETRICS INST., http://www.biometricsinstitute.org/pages/mission.html (last visited Nov. 
14, 2016). 
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FAA/DoD Working group created in 
2001 to analyze the 
efficacy of implementing 







DoD Focal point for 
coordination of biometric 
programs; voting 
members include general 
officers from the U.S. 
Army, Navy, Marine 






DoD Tasked with gathering 
operational requirements 
and resolving issues that 
affect the “joint 
biometrics enterprise.”297 
It includes all DoD 
Biometrics stakeholders 
such as Combatant 
Commands, agencies, 
Joint Staff, and Office of 
the Secretary of 
Defense.298  
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIOMETRIC CYBERSURVEILLANCE AND 
BIOMETRIC CYBERINTELLIGENCE 
The role biometric-enabled intelligence has played in U.S. operations in 
Afghanistan illustrates the breadth of military- and intelligence-related purposes 
served by biometrics as the U.S. military has “developed an extensive repository 
 
 295 NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 290. 
 296 U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 8521.01E, DOD BIOMETRICS (2016), http://www.cac.mil/docs/ 
8521.01-DoD-Biometrics.pdf. 
 297 BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, ANNUAL REPORT FY07 (2007), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=27030. 
 298 Id. 
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of biometric data across Afghanistan.”299 In particular, according to the U.S. 
military: 
[M]odes of biometric data allow both coalition and Afghan forces to 
protect themselves by ensuring that the ANSF [Afghan National 
Security Forces], local national workforce, Afghan Local Police, and 
reintegrating insurgents (and criminals) are who they say they are and 
can be screened against derogatory information (matches for previous 
incidents such as improvised explosive device [IED] attacks and other 
events that leave biometric information behind).300 
A database to enable nationwide identification and screening demonstrates 
the ways in which biometric data collected by the military and intelligence 
community may lead to long-term cybersurveillance consequences. As 
biometric databases may be increasingly shared between military, intelligence, 
and law enforcement organizations and other public and private entities, the 
biometric database screening systems may be increasingly integrated with other 
behavioral and contextual databases (e.g., consumer patterns, web browsing 
activity, data brokers predicting sexual orientation and religion, etc.) and 
biographical databases (e.g., passport databases, driver’s license databases, etc.). 
In this Part, the discussion first explores how surveillance technology 
designed for military and foreign intelligence purposes may migrate to domestic 
law enforcement uses. Part III.A looks briefly, but specifically, at digital 
watchlisting programs which tend to be anchored with biometric data. Part III.B 
focuses on military targeting based on cybersurveillance and biometrics. This 
technology does not appear to have migrated to domestic law enforcement use, 
it is relevant to any effort to interrogate the expanding capacities of biometric 
enabled intelligence. 
A. Biometrics in Intelligence-Driven Decisionmaking and Biometric-Based 
Digital Watchlisting 
One method of biometric surveillance that has been accepted by the 
intelligence community and is being used concurrently for military purposes 
abroad, as well as domestically, is digital watchlisting. “As with the military’s 
biometric data, information on each person is fed into a computer to find those 
 
 299 Pendall & Sieg, supra note 25, at 69.  
 300 Id. at 70. 
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who are on terrorist watch lists, have outstanding criminal warrants or even are 
just businessmen under investigation.”301 
Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. domestic and 
foreign intelligence community and homeland security structure has developed 
extensive database screening systems and watchlisting programs, including the 
“No Fly List,” the “Terrorist Watchlist,” the “Disposition Matrix,” and the “Kill 
List.”302 Abroad, the U.S. military has developed “Be on the Lookout” (BOLO) 
lists and database screening systems, and other watchlists.303 Increasingly, in 
Afghanistan, these database screening systems and watchlisting programs rely 
upon biometric data as a data backbone for screening purposes.304 
[A]ccording to Col. Fred Washington, director of the United States 
Army’s biometrics task force[:] Since 2007, when biometric collection 
began in Afghanistan, biometrics have been used to identify 3,000 
suspects on either Watch List 1 or Watch List 2, the American 
military’s two most serious classifications for possible insurgents or 
terrorists. In many cases, fingerprints found on bomb remains have 
identified the bomb maker . . . .305 
Across Regional Command–East (RC-E) [Afghanistan], biometric 
intelligence-driven operations have achieved major impacts on the 
insurgent ability to maintain leadership and lower-level cell structures 
as both coalition and Afghan forces regularly employ biometrically 
developed insurgent watch lists and ‘be on the lookout’ (BOLO) 
messages and as they execute deliberate detention operations.306 
Digital watchlists seem like the most natural and basic outgrowth of 
compiling biometric databases with nationwide aspirations, so their appearance 
both domestically and in combat zones is no surprise. At the most basic level, 
contextual data enables authorities to identify suspects fitting certain profiles, 
and biometric data allows the biographical profile to be pinned to a living human 
body. 
 
 301 Nordland, supra note 42. 
 302 Ian Cobain, Obama’s Secret Kill List—The Disposition Matrix, THE GUARDIAN (July 14, 2013, 2:00 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/14/obama-secret-kill-list-disposition-matrix. See also 
Margaret Hu, Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1773–76, 1786–92 (2015) (discussing background 
and due process risks of No Fly List and Terrorist Watchlist). 
 303 Pendall & Sieg, supra note 25, at 69. 
 304 Nordland, supra note 42. 
 305 Id. 
 306 Pendall & Sieg, supra note 25, at 69.  
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B. Biometric Cyberintelligence and NSA Cybersurveillance 
Due to the covert nature of drone attacks, limited information is available on 
the exact nature of NSA cybersurveillance, including biometrically-enabled 
intelligence that may inform targeted killings.307 Recent Snowden disclosures 
have revealed, however, that the NSA collects millions of digital photographs 
from Internet and social media sources and utilizes facial recognition technology 
to identify individuals for “precision targeting” purposes.308 According to these 
disclosures, the NSA’s “reliance on facial recognition technology has grown 
significantly over the last four years as the agency has turned to new software to 
exploit the flood of images included in emails, text messages, social media, 
videoconferences and other communications.”309 
The recent Snowden disclosures on NSA cybersurveillance programs and 
other media reports also appear to indicate that biometric data,310 if and when 
integrated with other dataveillance and cybersurveillance systems, may inform 
targeted killing technologies.311 Other media reports prior to the Snowden 
disclosures have indicated that the U.S. military is awarding contracts to develop 
the integration of biometric data into targeting technologies.312 Emerging big 
data cybersurveillance systems that integrate biometric technologies are 
championed as effective intelligence tools necessary to identify potential 
 
 307 See generally DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL: OBAMA’S SECRET WARS AND SURPRISING 
USE OF AMERICAN POWER 241–70 (2012) (describing use of drones and targeted killing strategy in the “war on 
terror”). 
 308 Risen & Poitras, supra note 31. 
 309 Id. 
 310 See, e.g., id. (explaining that the Snowden disclosures revealed the NSA collects millions of digital 
photographs from Internet and social media sources and utilizes facial recognition technology to identify 
individuals). 
 311 See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide, Snowden 
Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-
tracking-cellphone-locations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56-
c6ca94801fac_story.html; Greg Miller, Julie Tate & Barton Gellman, Documents Reveal NSA’s Extensive 
Involvement in Targeted Killing Program, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensive-involvement-in-targeted-killing-program/2013/10/ 
16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_story.html (“[A] collection of records in the Snowden trove . . . 
make clear that the drone campaign—often depicted as the CIA’s exclusive domain—relies heavily on the 
NSA’s ability to vacuum up enormous quantities of e-mail, phone calls and other fragments of signals 
intelligence, or SIGINT.”); Jeremy Scahill & Glenn Greenwald, The NSA’s Secret Role in the U.S. Assassination 
Program, INTERCEPT (Feb. 10, 2014, 12:03 AM), https://theintercept.com/2014/02/10/the-nsas-secret-role/ 
(explaining accuracy limits of what metadata-driven intelligence can yield in identifying appropriate targets for 
drone strikes). 
 312 See, e.g., Noah Shachtman, Army Tracking Plan: Drones that Never Forget a Face, WIRED (Sept. 28, 
2011, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/drones-never-forget-a-face.  
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terrorists through, for example, “integrat[ing] data from informants’ tips, drone 
footage, and captured phone calls.”313 
Infograph 1 demonstrates the manner in which biometric data and big data’s 
mass integrative systems help to inform cyberintelligence operations. 
Importantly, at the end of an operation, after “Deliver[y],” the “Finish” stage 
entails biometric enrollment—regardless of whether the result of delivery is a 
prisoner of war or an individual killed in action. Whatever role biometrics may 
play in targeting, the result, where possible, entails the collection of ever more 
biometric data. 
Infograph 1. Commanders Targeting Guidance: Biometrics/Exploitation as Part 
of the Targeting Cycles: U.S. Army314 
  
 
 313 Id. 
 314 CTR. FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED, NO. 11-25, HANDBOOK: COMMANDER’S GUIDE TO BIOMETRICS IN 
AFGHANISTAN 29 fig.4-1 (2011), https://info.publicintelligence.net/CALL-AfghanBiometrics.pdf.  
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To help explain why biometric cyberintelligence holds such appeal and why 
and how the rapid expansion of biometric cybersurveillance strategies is a 
military and intelligence priority, Table 3 focuses on how digitalized biometric 
data is increasingly integrated into weaponry generally and biometric drone 
weaponry in particular. 
Table 3. Biometric-Centered Weaponry and Biometric Drone Weaponry 
 
Program Agency Purpose 
Georgia Tech 
aerial drone project 








ACAGI Inc., a Maryland 
defense technology 
company317 
The facial recognition 
system connects to a 
portable database 
containing more than 1 
million faces. The 
camera can be placed 
into the optics of a 
soldier’s weapon, while 
the battery and processor 









Company received an 




 315 Cf. Peter Finn, A Future for Drones: Automated Killing, WASH. POST (Sept. 19, 2011), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/a-future-for-drones-automated-killing/2011/09/15/ 
gIQAVy9mgK_story.html?utm_term=.61c151a5e71a.  
 316 Id. 
 317 Martin Barillas, New Military Applications for Facial Recognition Technology, SPERO NEWS (Sept. 2, 
2012), http://www.speroforum.com/a/HCESHCICAJ39/73073-New-military-applications-for-facial-recognition-
technology. 
 318 Id. According to Jim Gavrilis of ACAGI, the technology “has met with a favorable reception in testing 
by the armed forces of the U.S. and allied countries.” Id. 
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and Location 
System 





drone designed to 
accompany ground 
troops, traverse difficult 
terrain, and carry up to 




ISCAN A small drone, fitted 
with explosives, is 
wirelessly controlled by 
an eye-tracking headset. 
“[The drone] can be 
sent to blow up 
whatever the wearer is 
looking at.”321 
 
Other recent media disclosures have offered information on advancements 
in drone video and imagery technology. Gorgon Stare technology, for instance, 
enables the U.S. Air Force to “transmit live video images of physical movement 
across an entire town.”322 Gorgon Stare, made of nine video cameras mounted 
on a drone, is designed to send up to sixty-five different images to multiple 
 
 319 Shachtman, supra note 312; 136 Phase I Selections from the 11.1 Solicitation, ARMY, 
https://sbir.defensebusiness.org/content/static/selections/abs2011-1/armyabs111.html (last visited Dec. 23, 
2016). According to the Army, this development in tagging, tracking, and locating (TTL) “overcomes a basic 
limitation in current TTL operations where inclement weather and objects of interest only appear[] periodically 
from sheltered positions or crowds.” Long Range, Non-Cooperative, Biometric Tagging, Tracking and Location, 
SBIR SOURCE, https://sbirsource.com/sbir/topics/85875 (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).  
 320 Christopher MacManus, DARPA’s Latest Footage of LS3 Robodog Astounds, CNET (Dec. 20, 2012, 
4:39 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/darpas-latest-footage-of-ls3-robodog-astounds/; see also The Future of 
Drones: Pack Mules and Camera Grenades, BBC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2012, 4:34 AM), http://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-19169023. The LS3 is not currently a biometric form of weaponry. However, 
given the advancement of facial recognition technology and tracking in compact systems, these technologies 
could be combined in the near future. 
 321 The Eyes Have It, ECONOMIST (Dec. 1, 2012), http://www.economist.com/news/technology-
quarterly/21567195-computer-interfaces-ability-determine-location-persons-gaze.  
 322 Ellen Nakashima & Craig Whitlock, With Air Force’s Gorgon Drone ‘We Can See Everything’, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 2, 2011, 12:09 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/01/ 
AR2011010102690.html. 
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users.323 ARGUS-IS, another recent advancement in imagery technology, can be 
drone-mounted and, from 17,500 feet, can capture objects as small as six inches 
on the ground.324 Further, ARGUS-IS possesses significant storage capacity, 
approximately one million terabytes of data per day, which can facilitate the 
cybersurveillance capacities of drones.325 Recent Snowden disclosures on 
biometric data indicate that “[t]he [NSA] has created teams of ‘identity 
intelligence’ analysts who work to combine the facial images with other records 
about individuals to develop comprehensive portraits of intelligence targets. The 
[NSA] has developed sophisticated ways to integrate facial recognition 
programs with a wide range of other databases.”326 As digitalized biometric data 
is increasingly integrated into weaponry technologies, including biometric drone 
weaponry and targeting technologies, the fusion of biometric data intelligence 
systems with drone surveillance technology deserves close attention. 
Yet, increasingly, and perhaps ironically, identity management technologies 
and identity dominance capacities allow the U.S. government to infer risk from 
suspicious digital data alone, without information on the actual identity of the 
target. For example, “a controversial [targeted killing] practice known as 
signature strikes . . . [targets those with] defining characteristics associated with 
terrorist activity, but whose identities aren’t necessarily known.”327 Signature 
strikes allow the intelligence community “to hit targets based solely on 
intelligence indicating patterns of suspicious behavior.”328 From media reports, 
it appears that signature strikes are informed in part by drone footage and 
potentially from other types of cybersurveillance.329 In other words, the use of 
signature strikes allows for drone attacks based upon suspicious data points, 
even when the identity of the individual targeted is unknown. 
 
 323 Id. 
 324 Damien Gayle, The Incredible U.S. Military Spy Drone That’s So Powerful It Can See What Type of 
Phone You’re Carrying from 17,500Ft, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 28, 2013, 2:56 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
sciencetech/article-2269563/The-U-S-militarys-real-time-Google-Street-View-Airborne-spy-camera-track-
entire-city-1-800MP.html.  
 325 Id. 
 326 Risen & Poitras, supra note 31. 
 327 DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE SOUL OF THE OBAMA 
PRESIDENCY 41 (2012). 
 328 Greg Miller, CIA Seeks New Authority to Expand Yemen Drone Campaign, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-seeks-new-authority-to-expand-yemen-drone-
campaign/2012/04/18/gIQAsaumRT_story.html. 
 329 See, e.g., id. 
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Some experts have concluded that “[t]he vast majority of drone strikes 
conducted by the CIA have been signature strikes.”330 The efficacy of targeting 
individuals for killing based on suspicious digital data requires close scrutiny. 
“[C]lassified government documents show[] that the drone strikes had killed 
hundreds of low-level suspected militants whose identities were not known.”331 
Nevertheless, the future of the Disposition Matrix and Kill List may be tied more 
and more to biometric identification technologies and mass cybersurveillance 
systems. 
C. The Posse Comitatus Act’s Potential to Limit Militarized 
Cybersurveillance in Civilian Contexts 
Following September 11, 2001, the U.S. military and the intelligence 
community have maintained an extensive presence in numerous foreign 
countries among populations that often contain large segments with a hostile or 
insurgent response to the United States’ presence. Accordingly, technologies of 
identity management—of which biometric ID cybersurveillance is one tool—
have become central to military population management. Consequently, there 
has been an expanded use of biometric data collection, storage, and analysis by 
the intelligence community and the armed services for purposes of strategic 
intelligence and military defense. Those biometric databases, in turn, now 
facilitate new forms of big data tracking and may entail unknown mass 
surveillance and mass targeting consequences. The integration of biometric 
database screening and biometric targeting into biometric drone weaponry and 
targeting drone strike technologies demonstrates the potential lethality of the 
emerging technological and policy development of biometric cyberintelligence. 
Importantly, the Snowden disclosures and recent criminal law cases show 
how big data cybersurveillance technologies deployed by military operations 
and the foreign intelligence community can facilitate law enforcement and 
prosecutorial activities. This cooperative data-sharing, or data-commingling, 
environment is now made possible by big data’s mass integrative potential. It 
necessitates careful scrutiny in that, historically, the PCA, Fourth Amendment, 
and other laws have been read to prohibit this cooperation to protect the 
separation of powers and to protect civilians from mass, indiscriminate 
 
 330 Kevin Jon Heller, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine’: Signature Strikes and International Law, 11 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 89, 90 (2013). 
 331 Scott Shane, Rights Groups, in Letter to Obama, Question Legality and Secrecy of Drone Killings, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/13/us/politics/rights-groups-question-legality-of-
targeted-killing.html. 
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surveillance activities. Significantly, though, recent criminal cases demonstrate 
the manner in which incriminating data—gathered either inadvertently or 
deliberately by intelligence activities, and at times gathered against average 
civilians and non-terrorist targets in mass data sweeps—can be shared with 
domestic law enforcement to enable prosecution. The fusion of biometric 
database matching systems with biographic and behavioral database matching 
systems, and the way in which this data fusion process can lead to policymaking, 
is transforming in a way that is more proactive and offensive in nature. It is 
presented, however, as a policymaking justification that is reactive and defensive 
in nature. 
The recent Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Dreyer provides an example 
of the migration of cybersurveillance technologies. It illustrates how 
cybersurveillance technology designed for foreign intelligence and military 
intelligence purposes can be used to enforce civilian laws through local and state 
law enforcement. Confronted with the application of military cybersurveillance 
of a civilian populace, the Ninth Circuit rejected the claim that such sweeping 
surveillance is permissible so long as its overall purpose is to root out military 
personnel engaged in unlawful activity. It further reserved the right to suppress 
evidence gathered through such cybersurveillance in the future where it violates 
the PCA. The result of Dreyer—in the form of the Ninth Circuit’s consideration 
of the possible remedy of excluding evidence and potentially overturning a 
criminal conviction of a person trafficking in child pornography332—reflects the 
Ninth Circuit’s concern about the breadth of the cybersurveillance employed as 
much as a concern with the Navy’s improper involvement in the enforcement of 
civilian laws. 
This Ninth Circuit case is historic in that it is the first time that a federal court 
has applied the PCA, intended to ensure recognition of a proper division between 
military and civilian activities, as a method to warn against military intelligence 
data gathering for domestic cybersurveillance overreach. In Dreyer, the PCA 
served as a statutory prohibitionon governmental cybersurveillance overreach, 
but only because the Ninth Circuit asserted that the PCA is grounded in 
constitutional norms—the necessary prerequisite to making exclusion a remedy 
for PCA violations. The court’s characterization of the PCA as constitutionally 
grounded may not survive Supreme Court scrutiny. 
 
 332 United States v. Dreyer, 804 F.3d 1266, 1278–81 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
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The argument in favor of the Ninth Circuit’s view is set out most strongly by 
the concurring opinion of Judge Marsha Berzon, which contends that the very 
structure of the Constitution reflects the importance of keeping the civilian and 
military spheres separate with the latter subordinate to the former.333 However, 
the argument in favor of the constitutional roots of the Posse Comitatus Act is a 
structural one. It is dependent upon showing how various constitutional 
amendments and clauses restrain and restrict military prerogatives when they 
collide with civilian rights. This dependency, therefore, also points out the Posse 
Comitatus Act’s vulnerability—the lack of any express constitutional language 
prohibiting military enforcement of civilian laws. Judge John Owens’s 
concurrence took issue with this view, deriding the “abstract constitutional 
principle” the court purported to find in the Constitution and noting that if such 
a principle existed, the Posse Comitatus Act would not be necessary to restrain 
the Executive Branch from resorting to military enforcement of civilian laws, as 
happened in the nineteenth century.334 Moreover, Judge Owens noted that unlike 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, which are clearly designed to protect 
individual rights, the PCA’s protections seem oriented more generally towards 
the people as a whole.335 
The constitutional question is complicated, but, in the context of 
cybersurveillance, increasingly important. The Constitution clearly contains 
provisions designed to hinder and limit a standing army,336 just as it also 
provides for the military to establish order during times of emergency—for 
example through congressional authority to call up “the Militia to execute the 
Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”337 The PCA 
accounts for exceptions like the latter constitutional provision by limiting its 
reach only to those instances not “expressly authorized by the Constitution or 
Act of Congress.”338 The existence of such exceptions makes it all the more 
difficult to argue that the PCA expresses a constitutional norm. Yet, that is 
precisely what some members of Congress understood when enacting the 
PCA.339 
 
 333 Id. at 1281–83 (Berzon, J., concurring).  
 334 Id. at 1284–85 (Owens, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 335 Id. at 1285. 
 336 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (limiting appropriations to support armies to a two-year limit). 
 337 Id.  
 338 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012).  
 339 See 7 Cong. Rec. 4240 (1878) (remarks of Sen. Kernan); 7 Cong. Rec. 4243 (1878) (remarks of Sen. 
Merrimon); United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 375 (4th Cir. 1974) (“several senators expressed the opinion 
that the Act was no more than an expression of constitutional limitations on the use of the military to enforce 
civil laws”). 
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Finally, it is worth discussing a 1974 Fourth Circuit PCA case, United States 
v. Walden.340 There, as with Dreyer, the court considered whether PCA-like 
restrictions were applicable.341 As with Dreyer, the Fourth Circuit declined to 
suppress evidence but chose to reserve such a remedy in case future military 
conduct warranted it.342 And like the Dreyer panel decision, the Fourth Circuit 
did not assess whether the PCA was grounded in the Constitution, but it did 
query whether PCA-like violations also presented constitutional violations.343 
However, the court’s examination of the issue was inconclusive because the 
Navy’s PCA-like restrictions provided a standard to evaluate the legality of the 
military conduct at issue.344 Nonetheless, the court opined that the PCA and its 
implementing regulations derive from “the traditional American insistence on 
exclusion of the military from civilian law enforcement, which some have 
suggested is lodged in the Constitution.”345 
In Dreyer, the Ninth Circuit grappled with the PCA’s constitutional 
underpinnings because such a determination was necessary before application 
of the exclusionary rule. The evolution of jurisprudence concerning the 
exclusionary rule is important here: it has been a traditional deterrent to unlawful 
surveillance. That question was avoided by the Fourth Circuit but necessarily 
decided by the Ninth Circuit. It will be front and center if military 
cybersurveillance or militarized cyberpolicing of civilians will be subject to 
judicial deterrents designed to protect the defendants in prosecutions deriving 
from such surveillance. And such defendants, like Dreyer, would typically be 
the most highly motivated and best-placed persons to identify and seek to 
remedy a PCA violation—so long as it meaningfully affects their own rights. 
The outcome of Dreyer suggests that the military—or those acting under the 
auspices of the military—may be held accountable for deliberate 
cybersurveillance overreach, especially if they share incriminating information 
with civilian authorities. Although Fourth Amendment concerns about 
cybersurveillance operate in the background of Dreyer, it is clearly not a Fourth 
Amendment case. If civilian law enforcement engages in the use of RoundUp to 
monitor computers statewide, it is unclear that there would be any remedy by 
litigants—or jurists—seeking to deter this kind of governmental invasion of 
 
 340 490 F.3d 372 (4th Cir. 1974).  
 341 Id. at 373.  
 342 Id. 
 343 Id. at 375–76.  
 344 Id.  
 345 Id. at 376.  
HU GALLEYSPROOFS2 2/22/2017 2:15 PM 
762 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:697 
privacy. In short, here, a sympathetic Ninth Circuit panel found, in the PCA-like 
restrictions applicable to the Navy, the legal restraint needed to establish strong 
precedent about military use of this kind of cybersurveillance stateside. It 
remains unclear, however, after the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision whether 
such surveillance can be deterred outside the military context, given that the 
Ninth Circuit acknowledged a breach but denied any effective remedy. 
Moreover, it is unclear if the Ninth Circuit opinion’s attempt in Dreyer to 
establish a firewall between military and civilian surveillance is either legally 
practicable or realistic. The court objected to the scope of the search itself, not 
to what was done with the results. Pragmatically speaking, cybersurveillance, in 
this case through RoundUp, may be more efficient when done broadly because 
it might be easier to sift the civilian positive hits from the military positive hits 
of the search than to sort out the civilian computer addresses from the military 
computer addresses at the outset. Moreover, the court’s holding seems to push 
against NSPD-59/HSPD-24, which seeks, for national security purposes, the 
“interoperability” of various federal agency data collection and storage 
methods.346 
CONCLUSION 
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, designed to limit the deployment of 
federal military resources in the service of domestic policies, may be ineffective 
as currently crafted and interpretted in light of the growth of cybersurveillance, 
and the adoption of cyberintelligence tools into day-to-day policing and 
governance functions. This Article describes a growing national bureaucratized 
cybersurveillance state that includes a host of technologies and government 
programs associated with the capture and analysis of biometric data. The 
military capture and use of biometric data, and the ways that it assists in the 
population management policies that are a component of current U.S. military 
operations abroad, deserves special attention. 
Such operations do not, at this juncture, necessarily pose a Posse Comitatus 
Act problem. Rather, this Article attempts to explain the way military 
efficiencies in biometric surveillance may—and do—translate into population 
management techniques stateside. In such contexts, the Posse Comitatus Act 
will not provide the legal teeth scholars currently search for to bring Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections up to speed with current advances in techniques 
 
 346 Directive on Biometrics, supra note 32. 
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of data surveillance. Yet, when the federal, state, and local government and 
military may collaborate in the sharing and analysis of data that targets civilian 
populations at large, mass cybersurveillance risks attach and should be 
acknowledged and questioned. In other words, when data is commingled and 
used for dual purposes, military, foreign intelligence, and civilian law 
enforcement can no longer be separated practicably on a technological level, and 
the policies that mandate the Posse Comitatus Act may be threatened. 
Maintaining strict separation of data between military and intelligence 
operations on the one hand, and civilian, homeland security, and domestic law 
enforcement agencies on the other, is increasingly difficult as cooperative data 
sharing increases. The Posse Comitatus Act and constitutional protections such 
as the Fourth Amendment’s privacy jurisprudence, therefore, must be reinforced 
in the digital age to appropriately protect citizens from militarized cyberpolicing: 
the blending of military/foreign intelligence tools and operations with homeland 
security/domestic law enforcement tools and operations. This Article concludes 
that, as of yet, neither statutory nor constitutional protections have sufficiently 
evolved to cover the unprecedented surveillance harms posed by the migration 
of biometric cyberintelligence from foreign to domestic use. 
 
